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ABSTRACT 
Why is it that some military organizations succeed and others do not? What 
characteristics elude unsuccessful fighting groups that successful ones are able to capture 
and translate into positive outcomes? The study of organizational theory and design spans 
the multiple typologies of organizational functions and forms. However, at the foundation 
of all groups are the individuals and the interaction of those individuals within the 
organization. Given this, the concept of unit cohesion can provide some insight in the 
search for discovering what makes organizations successful.   
Why study unit cohesion within Naval Special Warfare (NSW) operational units? 
The simple answer is because cohesion can increase performance and effectiveness. Prior 
to the last century, the concept of unit cohesion was based on the anecdotal observations 
of military commanders and historians. The rise of the fields of psychology and sociology 
led to an increase in the study and understanding of unit cohesion. This study utilizes 
survey research to investigate specific factors related to unit cohesion in NSW 
operational units and how they are related to current issues in the community. Ultimately, 
the impacts of these relationships provide a basis for recommendations intended to 
improve cohesion in, and overall effectiveness of NSW operational units. 
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Naval Special Warfare (NSW) is a military force that relies heavily on the capabilities of 
individuals and the resultant capabilities of operational units that are comprised of those 
individuals. The ability of NSW‘s primary units of action, the Troop, to act as a cohesive 
unit is directly related to its ability to perform effectively in any operational environment. 
This study examines unit cohesion in NSW Troops and offers four recommendations that 
will aid in forming more cohesive operational units and, ultimately, increasing the 
effectiveness of the NSW force. 
The following recommendations are presented in detail in Chapter VII of this 
study: 1) Conduct a strategic mission and capability evaluation within NSW—within the 
broader strategic vision of U.S Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)—in order to 
address disparities between NSW recruitment, selection, and training processes and 
current operational requirements; 2) Implement a Junior Leaders Conference that gives 
NSW community stakeholders an outlet to voice opinions, take part in community 
discussion, and open lines of communication with senior NSW commanders; 3) Develop 
a personnel rotation model that maintains leadership continuity through offset leadership 
rotation in NSW operational units to increase mission flexibility and improve unit 
cohesion and performance; and 4) Implement a program to develop psychological 
hardiness in NSW tactical leaders so that those leaders are equipped with additional tools 
to establish and expand cohesion in operational units and thereby improve performance 
and effectiveness. 
These recommendations are developed from an analysis of issues researched for 
this study. The primary research methods for this study were a survey and personal 
interviews with members of NSW. These produced quantitative and qualitative data that 
offered insights into unit cohesion, as well as other issues that indicate second- and third-
order effects on cohesion.  
The survey results demonstrate that cohesion in NSW Troops is higher than the 
published norms; however, the comments and interviews indicate that there factors 
 xviii 
external to the Troop that adversely affect cohesion and performance. A model developed 
in this study called the Perception-Reality Gap explains the majority of these issues. This 
model describes how the expectations of the members of the operational elements differ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare attack a lion. 
Four less brave men, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability 
and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely. 
       Colonel Ardent du Picq1 
Unit cohesion has at times been considered the sine qua non of battlefield 
performance. At other times, military commanders have diminished the relative 
importance of cohesion in favor of mass and sheer numbers. In the last 100 years, the 
idea and study of unit cohesion has moved beyond the meditations of philosopher 
warriors into the qualitative and quantitative realm of social science. Applying the 
modern tools of social science to the ancient notion of unit cohesion yields insights into 
how to better organize and train military units and ultimately improve their performance 
and effectiveness. 
A. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) traces its history from the beaches of Europe and 
the Pacific in World War II. In the years since, NSW has adapted to changes in the global 
and national security environment. As a small Special Operation Force (SOF), NSW units 
rely on stealth, teamwork, and violence of action to survive and succeed in missions 
against larger opponents. Developing bonds of trust between individuals and cohesion 
within units is critical to the success and survival of the NSW units operating in austere, 
ambiguous, and hostile environments. 
Prior to the last century, the concept of unit cohesion was based on the anecdotal 
observations of military commanders and historians. The rise of the fields of psychology 
and sociology led to an increase in the study and understanding of unit cohesion. 
Contributing to the understanding and analysis of cohesion are the concepts of primary 
and secondary groups. Distinguishing between primary and secondary groups allowed for 
                                                 
1 Charles Jean Jacques Joseph Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle, trans. Col. 
John N. Greely and Maj. Robert C. Cotton, Translated from Eighth Edition in French (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1921), 110. 
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the development of appropriate levels of analysis in cohesion studies. The overall concept 
of cohesion and the factors of influence vary when the level of analysis is moved from 
the individual to the primary group and, ultimately, the secondary group. 
Why study unit cohesion, and more specifically, why investigate unit cohesion 
within NSW operational units? The simple answer is because cohesion is directly related 
to performance. Therefore, the goal of this study is to investigate the factors of unit 
cohesion in NSW operational units with the intention improving the performance and 
effectiveness of the community as a whole. Ultimately, this investigation will identify 
specific factors, how there are related to current issues in the community, and lead to 
recommendations to improve cohesion in NSW and thereby performance. 
B. THEORETICAL MODEL 
Current cohesion literature is generally separated into the categories of military 
units, work groups, and sports teams. Each of these categories and the associated research 
provide insight into the factors of cohesion within NSW. Within these categories, the 
early unidimensional models of cohesion have yielded to more the encompassing 
multidimensional models. This investigation uses a multidimensional model because it 
better represents the factors influencing cohesion in NSW operational units. 
The social psychologists Guy L. Siebold and Dennis R. Kelly developed a 
multidimensional model based on three basic factors contributing to cohesion in military 
units. The three factors of horizontal, vertical, and organizational bonding are then each 
separated in affective and instrumental aspects. This model is valuable but does not 
represent the totality of factors influencing cohesion in NSW. To complete the theoretical 
framework developed in this study, the factors of leadership, selection and training, and 
hardiness are added. 
Hardiness is a relatively new concept that has been identified and developed over 
the last 30 years. Hardiness measures an individual‘s locus of control across the three 
domains of commitment, control, and challenge. A high-hardy individual is someone who 
has an internal locus of control. An individual with an internal locus of control is 
someone who believes he can influence and control the environment around them. 
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Conversely, a person with an external locus of control, low hardy, is someone who views 
his external environment as the primary influence on them. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH 
This study utilizes survey research as the primary means of data collection. In 
order to examine the hypothesized effects on unit cohesion in NSW Troops, this study 
combines two existing surveys with a series of original questions developed by the 
authors. Each survey section aligns with the factors addressed in the theoretical 
framework above. An adaptation of the Platoon Cohesion Index (PCI), developed by 
Siebold and Kelley, addresses the task and social cohesion aspects of this study‘s 
framework, while the Dispositional Resiliency Scale-15 (DRS-15) developed by Paul 
Bartone, examines the hardiness aspect of the framework. Finally, the factors of 
leadership and selection and training are examined in a section of the survey developed 
by the authors. This survey was distributed to individuals assigned to NSW‘s primary 
unit of action, the Troop. 
In addition to the survey questionnaire, interview questions were developed to 
provide an external assessment by mid-level leaders within NSW of cohesion and other 
factors affecting Troop performance. These assessments provide the larger context from 
within which the interplay of factors external and internal to the Troop is examined.  
The results of the research are best understood by separating them into qualitative 
and quantitative categories. For the quantitative analysis, the use of descriptive statistics 
and regression analysis provide some of the more noteworthy results. The qualitative 
responses, both from the interview questions and the comment blocks available on the 
survey, offer a somewhat less objective, though no less meaningful, sense of many of the 





From the quantitative and qualitative results, a number of observations and 
recommendations are drawn that seek to establish conditions that can improve unit 
cohesion and effectiveness within NSW. Due to the trickle-down impacts of decisions 
made within a bureaucratic structure, most of these recommendations, though ultimately 
seeking to impact cohesion and effectiveness, are directed at the larger organizational 
level. Additionally, several observations drawn from the research are made that have 
applicability to all levels of organization within NSW. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It can be seen from simple observation that some groups work well together while 
others struggle to accomplish the most basic task. Political and business leaders, 
sociologists and scientists, and generals and admirals throughout history have sought to 
understand this phenomenon and have attempted to define, explain, and harness the 
cohesiveness of groups. Beyond the anecdotal observations of history, the last 100 years 
has produced numerous theories on the nature, causes, and outcomes of group cohesion. 
The existing research of group cohesion has been thoroughly examined in three principal 
settings: (1) military units, (2) industrial/business work groups, and (3) sport teams. This 
chapter will review the literature of cohesion and explain the relevant theory relating to 
this study.  
B.  PRIMARY GROUPS 
When shifting the level of analysis external to the individual, it is necessary to 
understand the scope of the unit to be examined. This study will examine factors 
affecting the primary group. Sociologist Charles Cooley developed the idea of the 
primary group. Cooley defines the primary group as: 
Those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. 
They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are 
fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The 
result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of 
individualities in a common whole, so that one‘s very self, for many 
purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the 
simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a ‗we‘; it 
involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which ‗we‘ is 
the natural expression.2 
The importance of the primary group, particularly in military units, is described in 
the often-referenced paper by sociologists Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, on 
                                                 
2 Charles Horton Cooley, Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind (New York: Charles 
Scribner‘s Sons, 1911), 23. 
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cohesion in the Wehrmacht in WWII.3 They hypothesize ―that a soldier‘s ability to resist 
is a function of the capacity of his immediate primary group to avoid social 
disintegration.‖4 The social aspect of cohesion will be addressed further in the cohesion 
section.  Shils and Janowitz build from Cooley‘s construct of the primary group. They 
further hypothesize that primary group bonds are so powerful that the Allied propaganda 
attempts to discredit and show the ―wrongfulness‖ of secondary and political groups were 
largely unsuccessful.5 They argue that the strength of the primary group is what 
maintains a cohesive military unit. 
The primary group is the unit an individual associates, works, and socializes with 
on a regular face-to-face basis. Groups beyond this classification are referred to as 
secondary groups. This study will examine the factors of primary group cohesion in 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW). The primary group in NSW is the Troop.6 The size, 
organization, and employment of an NSW Troop fit the primary group model. Members 
of NSW Troops not only work and interact on a regular basis, but their very survival can 
depend on one another, in both training and combat scenarios. Secondary groups are 
groups that an individual is affiliated with but does not interact with on a regular basis. In 
the context of this study, the secondary groups of NSW operators are the organizational 
echelons above the NSW Troop: SEAL Squadron, NSW Group, and the NSW 
community as a whole. An NSW operator will see and interact with his Troop (primary 
group) and Troop leadership on a daily, if not hourly, basis. The same operator will know 
and recognize the Commanding Officer (CO) of his SEAL Team (secondary group); 
                                                 
3 Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz were U.S. intelligence officers during WWII and interrogated 
captured Wehrmacht soldiers. Their paper used anecdotal information from these interrogations to develop 
a theory on why the Wehrmacht fought ―stubbornly to the end.‖  
4 Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, ―Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War 
II,‖ The Public Opinion Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1948): 281. 
5 Shils and Janowitz, ―Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,‖ 281. 
6 There are three core operational units in NSW. The SEAL Squad is a 7-8 man unit, the Platoon is a 
15-16 man unit, and the Troop is a 30-35 man unit. A Platoon is made up of two Squads and a Troop 
contains two Platoons plus a small Command and Control (C2) section. NSW Platoons and Troops share 
the names U.S. Army organizational unit; however, the size and functions are different. A U.S. Army 
Platoon is an approximate 40-man unit that is usually made up of four separate Squads. A U.S. Army Troop 
is a cavalry unit that is similar in size and organization to a U.S. Army Company. 
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however, the operator would rarely interact with the CO in a professional or personal 
capacity. Figure 1 graphically depicts this example. 
 
Figure 1.    Group Dimensions, NSW Example 
C. WHY STUDY UNIT COHESION? 
1. Effectiveness-Performance  
There would hardly be reason to study unit cohesion, outside of general 
knowledge, if there was no utility in understanding the concept. This utility can be found 
in the correlation between unit cohesion and improved effectiveness and performance. 
There is a vast amount of literature describing, quantifying, and debating the importance 
 8 
of unit cohesion. Several studies use the technique of meta-analysis to synthesize 
multiple cohesion-performance studies across multiple group types.7 
Social psychology professors Charles R. Evan and Kenneth L. Dion examined 16 
studies with a total of 373 groups evaluated. The groups consisted of sports teams, 
experimental groups, and military units. Their meta-analysis found that ―cohesive groups, 
on average, tend to be more productive than non-cohesive groups‖ and ―that the 
relationship between group cohesion and group performance … is moderately strong and 
in a positive direction‖ with an uncorrected mean correlation of  +.364.‖8 
Social science researcher Laurel W. Oliver, in a paper for the U.S. Army 
Research Institute, examined 14 studies of real-world groups. This meta-analysis is 
particularly pertinent to this study because nine of the groups evaluated are military 
groups. The paper concludes that there is a ―moderately strong positive relationship 
between cohesion‖ with the weighted mean effect of +.320.9 
Psychologists Brian Mullen and Carolyn Copper conducted a meta-analysis of 49 
studies that examined the relationship between cohesion and performance, addressing 
three factors of cohesiveness—interpersonal attraction, commitment to task, and group 
pride.10 This analysis contains a tremendous amount of information pertaining to many 
aspects of unit cohesion. Similar to the previously referenced studies, the Mullen and 
Copper meta-analysis shows ―that the cohesiveness-performance effect does, in fact, exist 
 
 
                                                 
7 Gene V. Glass, ―Primary, Secondary, and Meta-Analysis of Research,‖ Educational Researcher 5, 
no. 10 (November 1, 1976): 3. Glass noted the lack of academic and statistical rigor in ―armchair literature 
reviews‖ and defines meta-analysis as ―the statistical analysis of a large collection of analysis results from 
individual studies.‖ 
8 Charles R. Evans and Kenneth L. Dion, ―Group Cohesion and Performance,‖ Small Group Research 
22, no. 2 (May 1, 1991): 179. 
9 Laurel W. Oliver, The Relationship of Group Cohesion to Group Performance: A Research 
Integration Attempt (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 
1988), 11, 13, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA199069. 
10 Brian Mullen and Carolyn Copper, ―The Relation Between Group Cohesiveness and Performance: 
An Integration,‖ Psychological Bulletin 115, no. 2 (March 1994): 221. 
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to a highly significant degree.‖11 This study finds the weighted mean effect of the 
cohesion-performance effect to be +.248 and that ―commitment to task appears to emerge 
as the critical component of cohesiveness.‖12  
The research team of Daniel J. Beal et al. uses a ―more fine-grained approach‖ to 
evaluate the correlation of performance and effectiveness and addresses some differences 
in results of their meta-analysis compared to the Mullen and Copper study.13 Beal et al. 
found ―stronger correlations between cohesion and performance when performance was 
defined as behavior (as opposed to outcome), when it was assessed with efficiency 
measures (as opposed to effectiveness measures), and as patterns of team workflow 
became more intensive.‖14 Contrary to Mullen and Copper, Beal et al. found a correlation 
between interpersonal attraction, commitment to task, and group pride and performance.  
This study found the mean corrected correlation between cohesion performance as 
performance to be +.301.15 
Across several meta-analyses, there is concurrence that there is a correlated 
increase in effectiveness and performance with an increase also in unit cohesion. This 
concurrence demonstrates that efforts to understand and to improve unit cohesion have a 
utility beyond generalized knowledge. 
a. Causality 
The relationship between cohesion and effectiveness is nebulous and can 
often lead to ―chicken and egg‖ debates about causality. Anecdotal observation shows 
that winning or successful groups and sports teams generally experience an increase in 
cohesion.  There seems to be a reinforcing loop that positive cohesion can improve 
performance and positive performance can improve cohesion.  Mullen and Copper 
 
                                                 
11 Mullen and Copper, ―The Relation Between Group Cohesiveness and Performance,‖ 222. 
12 Ibid., 216, 221. 
13 Daniel J. Beal et al., ―Cohesion and Performance in Groups: A Meta-Analytic Clarification of 
Construct Relations,‖ Journal of Applied Psychology 88, no. 6 (December 2003): 990. 
14 Beal et al., ―Cohesion and Performance in Groups,‖ 989. 
15 Ibid., 996. 
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―suggest that changes in cohesiveness that can be brought about by performance are 
likely to be stronger than changes in performance that can be brought about by 
cohesiveness.‖16 
D. WHAT COHESION IS NOT 
To better understand unit cohesion, it is beneficial to remove confusing and 
conflicting definitions before specifying what the subject is.  This section will examine 
one level of analysis above and one level below the primary group.  These levels of 
analysis are continuous and overlapping with no finite borders delineating where one 
level ends and another begins.17  Therefore, the level of analysis above and below the 
primary group must be identified because both will have an effect on cohesion in the 
primary group.  
 
Figure 2.    Level of Analysis 
                                                 
16 Mullen and Copper, ―The Relation Between Group Cohesiveness and Performance,‖ 224. 
17 Larry H. Ingraham and Frederick J. Manning, ―Cohesion: Who Needs It, What Is It and How Do 
We Get It To Them?,‖ Military Review 61, no. 6 (1981): 7. 
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Figure 2 visually depicts the levels of analysis directly above and below the 
primary group. Additionally, the figure shows the aspects of cohesion relevant to the 
individual and the secondary group.  Now that the levels of analysis above and below the 
primary group have been described, we can focus on what unit cohesion is. 
1. Morale 
The individual is at the level of analysis below the primary group level. In relation 
to group cohesion, the primary individual factor affecting the group as a whole is the 
individual‘s morale. Morale is ―the individual level of analysis as a psychological state of 
mind characterized by a sense of well-being based on confidence in the self and in 
primary groups.‖18 The social psychologist Robert J. MacCoun wrote an extensive 
chapter on unit cohesion and military performance for a RAND report investigating the 
military policy of Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell (DADT). He writes that morale ―reflect[s] the 
general level of motivation and satisfaction among members of a group.‖19 Both of these 
definitions are appropriate with respect to the level of analysis. Each shows that morale is 
unique to the individual and that the individual‘s morale will affect the cohesion of the 
group. Working from cohesion down to morale, one researcher describes how group 
cohesion will also improve individual morale and job satisfaction.20  
2. Esprit de Corps 
At the secondary group level of analysis, the factor corresponding to cohesion is 
group pride. Earlier in this chapter, we defined secondary groups as groups that an 
individual is affiliated with but does not interact with on a regular basis. The main 
distinction between primary and secondary groups is that primary groups are influenced 
by daily face-to-face interaction. Beal et al. describes group pride as ―the extent to which 
group members exhibit liking for the status or the ideologies that the group supports or 
                                                 
18 Ingraham and Manning, ―Cohesion,‖ 7. 
19 Robert J. MacCoun, ―What is known about Unit Cohesion and Military Performance,‖ in Sexual 
Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy: Options and Assessment, ed. Bernard D. Rostker and Scott 
A. Harris (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), 289, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR323/index.html. 
20 Michael A. Hogg, The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction to Social 
Identity (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 120. 
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represents, or the shared importance of being a member of the group.‖21  Group pride is a 
term generally used outside of the military context; whereas, the term esprit de corps, 
literally ―spirit of the body,‖ is more often used within the military context and is deeply 
rooted in military history.22 U.S Army psychologists Lt. Col. Larry H. Ingraham and Maj. 
Frederick J. Manning further expand their description of esprit de corps as being 
―generally reserved for large collectives above the level of face-to-face interaction, also 
characterized by pride in group membership, but especially by unity of purpose and 
devotion to the cause.‖23 
E. WHAT COHESION IS 
There are nearly as many definitions and descriptions of cohesion as there are 
authors on the subject. This problem is compounded by the fact that there is little 
agreement within the field of how to measure cohesion.24 Part of this problem stems from 
that fact that group cohesion means different things to different groups. The purpose and 
context of the group will affect the perceptions of what cohesion is to each respective 
group. The concept of cohesion will have a completely different purpose and context for 
a therapy group, a National Football League team, a SEAL Troop, and a group of 
undergraduates in a psychology experiment. 
1. Unidimensional  
At the conceptual level, there has been debate about whether cohesion is 
unidimensional or multidimensional. Early definitions and investigations into the nature 
                                                 
21 Beal et al., ―Cohesion and Performance in Groups,‖ 995. 
22 Ingraham and Manning, ―Cohesion,‖ 6. 
23 Ibid., 7. 
24 All of these authors describe the extensive history of attempting to define and measure cohesion. If 
fact, most authors writing on the subject in last 30 years have noted this problem. Albert V. Carron and 
Lawrence R. Brawley, ―Cohesion: Conceptual and Measurement Issues,‖ Small Group Research 31, no. 1 
(2000): 245; Milly Casey-Campbell and Martin L. Martens, ―Sticking It All Together: A Critical 
Assessment of the Group Cohesion–Performance Literature,‖ International Journal of Management 
Reviews 11, no. 2 (June 2009): 224; Albert A. Cota et al., ―The Structure of Group Cohesion,‖ Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin 21, no. 6 (1995): 573; N. J. Evans and P. A. Jarvis, ―Group Cohesion: A 
Review and Reevaluation,‖ Small Group Research 11, no. 4 (1980): 359; Paul S. Goodman, Elizabeth 
Ravlin, and Marshall Schminke, ―Understanding Groups in Organizations,‖ Research in Organizational 
Behavior 9 (1987): 145; Peter E. Mudrack, ―Defining Group Cohesiveness: A Legacy of Confusion,‖ Small 
Group Research 20, no. 1 (February 1, 1989): 38. 
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of cohesion were strictly unidimensional. Representative of unidimensional models, an 
early study of cohesion defined it as the ―total field of forces causing members to remain 
in the group.‖25 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a renewed academic interest in the 
concept of cohesion developed into the current multidimensional models. 
2. Multidimensional 
The early unidimensional models of unit cohesion proved inadequate and 
researchers sought to find models including more dimensions to encompass the totality of 
cohesion. The sports psychologists Albert V. Carron et al. developed a multidimensional 
conceptual model while developing an instrument to assess cohesion in sport teams 
(Group Environment Questionnaire).  Their model of cohesion is based on the categories, 
or dimensions, of group integration and individual attractions to the group.26 Carron and 
Brawley further explain that group integration (GI) ―reflect[s] the individual’s 
perceptions about what the group believes about its closeness, similarity, and bonding as 
a whole and the degree of unification of the group field.” Individual Attractions to the 
Group (ATG) “reflect[s] the individual’s personal motivations to remain in the group, as 
well as his or her personal feelings about the group.”27 Each category is then further 
subdivided into task and social aspects. The task aspect is viewed as a general orientation 
toward achieving the group‘s goals and objectives and the social aspect is viewed as the 
general orientation toward developing and maintaining social relationships within the 
group.28 This multidimensional approach leads Carron to define cohesion as “a dynamic 
process that is reflected in the tendency for a group to stick together and remain united in 
the pursuit of its instrumental objectives and/or for the satisfaction of member affective 
needs.”29 
                                                 
25 Leon Festinger, Stanley Schachter, and Kurt W. Back, Social Pressures in Informal Groups: A 
Study of Human Factors in Housing (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1950), 164. 
26 Albert V. Carron, W. N. Widmeyer, and Lawrence R. Brawley, ―The Development of an Instrument 
to Assess Cohesion in Sport Teams: The Group Environment Questionnaire,‖ Journal of Sport Psychology 
7, no. 3 (1985): 248. 
27 Carron and Brawley, ―Cohesion: Conceptual and Measurement Issues,‖ 90. 
28 Carron, Widmeyer, and Brawley, ―The Development of an Instrument to Assess Cohesion in Sport 
Teams,‖ 248. 
29 Carron and Brawley, ―Cohesion: Conceptual and Measurement Issues,‖ 94. 
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In a military context, Col. James Griffith examined the factors of cohesion in 93 
companies of U.S. Army soldiers. He identified seven subscales of cohesion: unit social 
climate, concerned leadership, unit teamwork, sense of pride, small-unit command 
confidence, senior command confidence, and company combat.30 From his empirical 
research, he develops a two ―fundamental‖ dimension conceptual model of cohesion 
encapsulating the direction and functions of cohesion. The direction of cohesion is the 
contrast between vertical cohesion (superior-subordinate relations) and horizontal 
cohesion (peer-to-peer relations). The functions of cohesion are the contrasts between the 
instrumental, or task performance, aspects of cohesion and the affective, or interpersonal 
support, aspects of cohesion.31 Griffith‘s seven subscales all nest within the two 
dimensional model. 
Similar to the Carron et al. sports model, social psychologists Guy L. Siebold and 
Dennis R. Kelly began to develop an instrument to measure cohesion in military units, 
the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire (CPCQ). Their definition of cohesion set the 
foundation for their conceptual model: ―cohesion is a unit or group state varying in the 
extent to which the mechanisms of social control maintain a structured pattern of positive 
social relationships (bonds) between unit members, individually and collectively, 
necessary to achieve the unit or group‘s purpose.‖32 From this definition, they 
operationalize three types of bonding that affects cohesion: horizontal, vertical, and 
organizational. Horizontal and vertical bonding is defined similarly to Griffith‘s 
explanation above. Organizational bonding is described as the relationships between the 
unit members and their unit as a whole. Siebold and Kelly, like Griffith, consider 
relationship or bond to have both affective (emotional/reactive) and instrumental 
(task/proactive) aspects.33  
                                                 
30 James Griffith, ―Measurement of Group Cohesion in US Army Units,‖ Basic and Applied Social 
Psychology 9, no. 2 (1988): 159. 
31 Griffith, ―Measurement of Group Cohesion in US Army Units,‖ 165. 
32 Guy L. Siebold and Dennis R. Kelly, Development of the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire 
(Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1988), 1, 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA204917. 
33 Siebold and Kelly, Development of the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire, 2. 
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The CPCQ was subsequently developed into the shorter Platoon Cohesion Index 
(PCI).34 The PCI uses the same conceptual model as the CPCQ with the three types of 
bonding with two corresponding aspects.  Since the PCI serves as the foundation for our 
investigation of cohesion in NSW, we will attempt to better explain the conceptual model 
and define the two aspects of each bonding type. Table 1 defines and explains the 
different aspect of each bonding type.   
 
PCI Conceptual Model 
 Relationship (Bonds) 
Affective Instrumental 
Horizontal 
Peer bonding - the extent to 
which peers trust and care 
about one another. 
Teamwork - how well the peers work 
together to get the job done. 
Vertical 
Leader caring - the degree to 
which leaders look out for and 
help their subordinates. 
Leader competence - the extent to 
which leaders have the skills and 
abilities to lead in training and in 
combat. 
Organizational 
Member identification with the 
unit and what it stands for and 
feeling good or bad about the 
unit. 
Exchange relationship in which the 
members work to achieve the 
organization‘s goals in exchange for 
the organization facilitating the 
members‘ attainment of their needs 
and goals. 
Table 1.    PCI Conceptual Model35 
3. Primary and Secondary Dimensions 
Albert A. Cota et al. agree that multidimensional conceptual models have a better 
potential to explain what is empirically and theoretically known about cohesion than 
unidimensional models.36 In fact, they praise both Carron and Griffith for advancing the 
field in developing multidimensional models.37 Cota et al. builds on specific group 
                                                 
34 Guy L. Siebold and Dennis R. Kelly, Development of the Platoon Cohesion Index (Alexandria, VA: 
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1988), 2, 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA205478. 
35 Siebold and Kelly, Development of the Platoon Cohesion Index, 2, 3. 
36 Cota et al., ―The Structure of Group Cohesion,‖ 576. 
37 Carron, Widmeyer, and Brawley, ―The Development of an Instrument to Assess Cohesion in Sport 
Teams,‖ 575. 
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models of Carron and Griffith to develop an even broader heuristic that will incorporate 
all types of groups. Their examination of both the empirical and conceptual literature of 
cohesion leads them to the notion of primary and secondary dimensions of group 
cohesion. ―Primary dimensions are applicable to describing the cohesiveness of all or 
most types of groups, whereas secondary dimensions are applicable to describing the 
cohesiveness of specific types of groups.‖38 This heuristic recognizes that regardless of 
type, function, or purpose, there are broad similarities across all groups in the primary 
dimension. The distinct natures of specific groups types is captured in the notion of 
secondary dimensions. This primary and secondary dimensional analysis is how we 
developed our hypotheses related to factors of cohesion in NSW. 
F. HARDINESS 
The concept of hardiness appears in numerous papers that indicate a relationship 
to unit cohesion. Suzanne C. Kobasa first described the concept of hardiness in a 
longitudinal study of executives at the telecommunication corporation AT&T. The study 
examined the relationship between levels of stress and rates of illness. In the course of the 
study, she found a very distinct pattern in the rates of illness in the high stress group. The 
pattern clearly delineated the two groups, the high stress/low illness and high stress/high 
illness. Kobasa hypothesized that ―persons who experience high degrees of stress without 
falling ill have a personality structure differentiating them from persons who become sick 
under stress.‖39 The study revealed that the high stress/low illness group shared three 
general characteristics: (a) they believe that they can control or influence the events of 
their experience (control), (b) they feel deeply involved in or committed to the activities 
of their lives (commitment), and (c) they anticipate change as an exciting challenge to 
further development (challenge).40 She described the high stress/low illness group 
members with the three characteristics from above as hardy individuals. Several studies 
                                                 
38 Cota et al., ―The Structure of Group Cohesion,‖ 576. 
39 Suzanne C. Kobasa, ―Stressful Life Events, Personality, and Health: An Inquiry into Hardiness,‖ 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, no. 1 (January 1979): 3. 
40 Kobasa, ―Stressful Life Events, Personality, and Health: An Inquiry into Hardiness,‖ 3. 
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have tested the factors contributing to the hardiness concept and confirm Kobasa 
hypothesis on the three factors contributing to hardiness.41  
1. Dispositional Resilience Scale (DRS) 
Since Kobasa‘s initial research, multiple instruments have been developed to 
measure hardiness.42 The Dispositional Resilience Scale (DRS) is a hardiness 
measurement instrument developed by U.S. Army research psychologist Paul T. Bartone 
and used in numerous hardiness studies on U.S. military personnel.43 The DRS was 
originally a 45-item instrument and has subsequently been narrowed to a 30-item and 
finally to a 15-item instrument.44 The DRS-15 will be the instrument used in our survey 
research to measure hardiness in NSW individuals. 
G. SELECTION AND TRAINING 
Some researchers have proposed that higher levels of selection and increasingly 
difficult training will help increase unit cohesion.45 Another study compared Special 
Forces (SF) teams to conventional units and found higher levels of mental and physical 
health and greater levels of job and career satisfaction in the SF teams.46 One problem 
with this study is that it simply assumes that the SF units have higher levels of cohesion. 
                                                 
41 Steven C. Funk, ―Hardiness: A Review of Theory and Research,‖ Health Psychology 11, no. 5 
(1992): 335-345; Mina Westman, ―The Relationship Between Stress and Performance: The Moderating 
Effect of Hardiness,‖ Human Performance 3, no. 3 (1990): 141; Nerella V. Ramanaiah, J. Patrick Sharpe, 
and Anupama Byravan, ―Hardiness and Major Personality Factors,‖ Psychological Reports 84, no. 2 
(1999): 497–500. 
42 Funk, ―Hardiness,‖ 336; Salvatore R. Maddi, ―Relevance of Hardiness Assessment and Training to 
the Military Context,‖ Military Psychology 19, no. 1 (2007): 64. 
43 Paul T. Bartone, ―Development and Validation of a Short Hardiness Measure‖ (Paper presented at 
the Third Annual Convention of the American Psychological Society, Washington, D.C., June 1991), 
http://www.hardiness-resilience.com/docs/aps91b.pdf; Paul T. Bartone, ―Resilience Under Military 
Operational Stress: Can Leaders Influence Hardiness?,‖ Military Psychology 18, no. 3 (2006): 131–148; 
Paul T. Bartone et al., ―Psychological Hardiness Predicts Success in US Army Special Forces Candidates,‖ 
International Journal of Selection and Assessment 16, no. 1 (March 2008): 78–81. 
44 P. T. Bartone et al., ―The impact of a military air disaster on the health of assistance workers: A 
prospective study,‖ The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 177, no. 6 (1989): 317; Paul T. Bartone, 
―Test-Retest Reliability of the Dispositional Resilience Scale-15, A Brief Hardiness Scale,‖ Psychological 
Reports 101 (2007): 943–944. 
45 Griffith, ―Measurement of Group Cohesion in US Army Units,‖ 167. 
46 Frederick J. Manning and Terrence D. Fullerton, ―Health and Well-Being in Highly Cohesive Units 
of the U.S. Army,‖ Journal of Applied Social Psychology 18, no. 6 (1988): 515. 
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The researchers did not test and compare levels of cohesion between the SF and 
conventional units. Beyond this study, there is a deficiency in comparing cohesion levels 
between SOF and conventional units. 
Part of the research design of this study is to compare levels of cohesion between 
two distinct groups within NSW that have different levels of selection and training. 
Defense analyst Michele L. Malvesti specifies two distinct mission forces within Special 
Operations Forces (SOF): theater mission forces and national mission forces. Theater 
mission forces are assigned to Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) and are 
―designed to maintain a persistent presence and cultivate long-term military-to-military 
relationships within their respective regions, as well as provide the Geographic 
Combatant Commanders dedicated Special Operations capability.‖ Conversely, national 
mission forces do not report to TSOCs and are designed for ―extremely sensitive 
operations, often of national importance.‖47  
National mission forces usually involve additional levels of selection and training 
above and beyond theater mission forces. To compare the effects of additional selection 
and training within NSW, levels of cohesion will be compared between the two forces. 
H. THE BAD AND THE UGLY 
Unit cohesion has numerous benefits; specifically, higher levels of cohesion 
correlate to improved performance and effectiveness. Unfortunately, there are aspects of 
cohesion that can cause problems for the individual, the primary group, and the 
secondary group. Extremely high levels of primary group cohesion can lead to a drift 
from the goals of the secondary or organizational group. Griffith cites an example of new 
employees at a Western Electric plant being physically impeded, by more experienced 
coworkers, from higher levels of productivity to conform to primary group output 
levels.48 The primary group found utility in slowing production to the group‘s benefit, but 
to the detriment of the company. High levels of social cohesion can lead to bouts of rigid 
                                                 
47 Michele L. Malvesti, To Serve the Nation: US Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent 
Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Security, 2010), 9, 11. 
48 Griffith, ―Measurement of Group Cohesion in US Army Units,‖ 168. 
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thinking and poor decision-making called groupthink.49 Groupthink is described as 
―deficient group decision-making processes that have a high probability of producing 
poor decisions with disastrous consequences.‖50 Social psychologist Stanley Milgram, in 
his famous Milgram experiments, warns that too much vertical cohesion or obedience to 
authority can have negative consequences as well.51 At the other end of the spectrum, 
groups of proven performers can fail if they do not cohere and work as a team.  The 2004 
USA Olympic men‘s basketball team was composed of star talent from the National 
Basketball Association, but could not, or would not, work together to perform at the 
expected level.52 The teams poor cohesion led to their disappointing bronze medal 
performance. 
Cohesion can be viewed as a continuum with an ideal point somewhere in the 
middle. Both too much and too little cohesion will render the performance correlation 
useless. 
                                                 
49 Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and 
Fiascoes (Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1972). 
50 Hogg, The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction to Social Identity, 135. 
51 Stanley Milgram, ―Group Pressure and Action Against a Person,‖ Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology 69, no. 2 (August 1964): 137–143. 
52 David DuPree, ―U.S. Men‘s Basketball Falls Flat on World Stage,‖ USA Today, August 15, 2004, 
sec. Olympics. 
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III. THEORY 
This study attempts to answer two questions that address a significant aspect of 
overall NSW effectiveness.  First, what factors influence unit cohesion among NSW 
Troops?  This question establishes the basis of the empirical research conducted in this 
study.  The results of this initial research will provide the foundation upon which the 
second question can be answered.  Second, what measures can be taken to improve unit 
cohesion within the NSW Troop?  This question builds upon the first research question 
and seeks to suggest potential remedies to the voids identified through the empirical 
research. 
Underlying this second question is the assumption that unit cohesion within NSW 
Troops needs improvement in the first place.  This assumption is based upon observations 
made by leadership within the NSW community specifically regarding a phenomenon 
known informally as ―flush-and-fill.‖ This issue is a byproduct of an organizational 
transformation that will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As identified in the literature, there are a number of theories suggesting myriad 
causal mechanisms that contribute to cohesion among groups.  Upon examining these 
theories and applying their respective principles to the focus of this study, it was 
determined that a multidimensional approach is best suited to examine unit cohesion 
within NSW units.  Building upon the work conducted by Albert A. Cota et al., from 
Chapter II, this study uses a similar approach and frames the hypotheses within the 
context of primary and secondary dimensions of unit cohesion.  Primary dimensions are 
those factors of unit cohesion that are common amongst all or most groups.  Secondary 
dimensions are those factors that are common amongst specific types of groups.53 For 
example, the different factors of cohesion between sports teams and therapy groups are 
considered secondary dimensional factors.  Conversely, factors applicable to both types 
                                                 
53 Cota et al., ―The Structure of Group Cohesion,‖ 573. 
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of groups are considered to fall within the primary dimension.  The hypotheses are 
constructed around independent variables stemming from each of these dimensions. 
1. Primary Dimension 
Though the primary dimension encompasses factors that are common among a 
disparate selection of groups, the dynamics within this dimension can be vastly different 
depending on the nature of the group in question. This can certainly be said of the nature 
of a group such as NSW and the work it performs. Much of the work that NSW units 
perform is physically and mentally demanding and quite often highly dangerous. This 
requires a high degree of alignment in terms of task accomplishment and trust between 
the individual members of the group. Furthermore, the amount of time NSW Troops 
spend together in training and on deployment requires that these personal relationships be 
well developed with regard to work accomplishment and personal interaction outside of 
the work environment. The review of the pertinent literature in Chapter II identified the 
affective (social) and instrumental (task) aspects of cohesion that can vary in importance 
depending upon the work a certain group performs. These aspects of cohesion are 
common across most groups; however, the degree to which these matter to NSW may be 
greater because of the unique tasks that they perform and the amount of personal 
interaction required of the individuals in order to be successful. 
a. Hypothesis 1 – Social Cohesion 
Increased trust and commitment among Troop members and their 
leadership will lead to increased levels of unit cohesion because individuals exhibiting 
greater levels of commitment to one another are able to translate shared social 
experiences into a professional relationship. 
b. Hypothesis 2 – Task Cohesion 
Greater commitment to operational and task performance by Troop 
members and their leadership leads to increased levels of unit cohesion because task-
oriented individuals with a common goal will unite in an effort to accomplish that goal in 
spite of vastly different social, economic, or educational backgrounds. 
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2. Secondary Dimension 
The unique nature of the tasks carried out by the military in general—and NSW in 
particular—adhere to the criteria for examination within the secondary dimension of 
cohesion described thus far. Specific to NSW, the historic foundations of the selection 
process—dating back to the immediate requirement to form demolition units during 
World War II54—likely have significant implications for cohesion within the operational 
elements. Additionally, the concept of hardiness, introduced in Chapter II, suggests that 
individuals possessing this trait are first, more likely to complete an arduous selection and 
training process, and second, more prone to succeed under the austere conditions and 
hostile environments in which NSW forces operate. 
a. Hypothesis 3 – Selection and Training 
Units whose selection criteria and training curriculum are more arduous 
tend to be more cohesive due to the fact that the individuals within these units have 
endured a rite of passage that establishes a commonly shared experience. 
b. Hypothesis 4 – Hardiness 
Increased level of collective individual hardiness in groups leads to 
increased levels of unit cohesion within that group because the individuals are able to 
recognize an opportunity for growth within hardship and translate that growth into 
positive output. 
3. Other Factors  
a. Leadership 
Leadership is a multifaceted dynamic that can affect various aspects of 
unit cohesion. Specifically, this investigation will examine three factors of leadership: 
how leadership deals with adversity, leadership compassion, and Troop member 
 
 
                                                 
54 Chapter IV provides a brief history of Naval Special Warfare. 
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confidence of leadership in combat. Additional questions outside of the Platoon Cohesion 
Index (PCI) and the Dispositional Resilience Scale-15 (DRS-15) were added to the 
overall survey to measure these factors. 
B. THEORETICAL MODEL 
The model of cohesion developed by social psychologists Guy L. Siebold and 
Dennis R. Kelly in the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire (CPCQ) and further 
refined in the PCI is based on three basic factors contributing to unit cohesion. The three 
factors of horizontal, vertical, and organizational bonding are then each separated in 
affective and instrumental aspects. Figure 3 graphically represents the six factors 
affecting unit cohesion in the CPCQ and PCI model. 
 
Figure 3.    Cohesion Components55  
                                                 
55 Siebold and Kelly, Development of the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire, 3. 
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Table 1 in Chapter II provides the basic definitions of the six cohesion 
components. Each cohesion component corresponds to a basic concept that is relatively 
easy to understand. Siebold and Kelly describe these basics concepts as cohesion measure 
scale areas. These cohesion measure scale areas are displayed in Figure 4 by using the 
same graphic in Figure 3 and replacing the cohesion component with the corresponding 
cohesion measure scale areas. 
 
Figure 4.    Cohesion Measure Scale Areas from Siebold and Kelly56 
Hypothesis 1 is derived from affective horizontal and vertical bonding and the 
corresponding areas of peer bonding and leader caring on the cohesion measure scale. 
Hypothesis 2 is derived from instrumental horizontal and vertical bonding and the 
corresponding areas of teamwork and leader competence. Comparing the components of 
                                                 
56 Siebold and Kelly, Development of the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire, 5. 
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cohesion between Theater Mission Forces (TMF) and National Mission Forces (NMF) 
will highlight the influence of selection and training in Hypothesis 3.  Hypothesis 4 will 
be explored by comparing the DRS-15 to aspects of the PCI and the additional questions 
outside of the PCI and DRS. This will provide some insight into how Kobasa‘s concept 
of hardiness influences unit cohesion. 
Combining the four hypotheses described above with the additional factors of 
leadership comprises the overall concept of unit cohesion to be explored in this study. 
Figure 5 combines all the proposed factors and graphically represents the theoretical 
framework outlined above. Five conceptual contributors combine to affect unit cohesion. 
The correlation between cohesion and effectiveness, described in Chapter II, is the reason 
for conducting this investigation. 
 
Figure 5.    Theory of NSW Unit Cohesion 
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C. LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
The core operational unit of NSW has been in a constant state of change and 
refinement throughout the roughly 70-year history of NSW. From the 5-to-7 man boat 
crews of the Naval Combat Demolition Units (NCDU) in Europe, the 100-man 
Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) in the Pacific, the 14-man Platoons of SEALs in 
Vietnam, to 35-man SEAL Troops employed in the current conflicts, the numerical size 
of the core operational unit has changed to meet tactical needs. The target unit of this 
cohesion investigation is the current 35-man SEAL Troop. Although the Troop comprises 
smaller functional units that can work independently, it is the Troop that works, trains, 
and deploys together. Troop members become thoroughly acquainted, both professionally 
and personally, during the 24-month workup and deployment cycle.  
The notion of the primary group, developed by the sociologist Charles Cooley, is 
described in the literature review. The primary group is ―characterized by intimate face-
to-face association and cooperation.‖57 The size and practical utilization of a SEAL 
Troop is in alignment with this definition of the primary group. Troop members are 
highly interdependent and must work together to accomplish designated assignments and 
tasks. Both training assignments and operational deployments are usually at the Troop 
level. This time together, usually away from higher command, reinforces the primary 
group bonds of the Troop.  
Outside of the scope of primary group cohesion are the NSW organizational units 
directly above and below the SEAL Troop. The next organizational level above the 
SEAL Troop is the Squadron. The Squadron or SEAL Team is comprised of three or four 
SEAL Troops and is too large an organization to meet the criteria for being labeled a 
primary group. An NSW operator would have little interaction with another operator in 
another Troop and very rarely would the operator be in contact with leadership in the 
headquarters element of the Squadron.  
If this investigation had been conducted prior to 2001, the primary group studied 
would have been SEAL Platoon. The SEAL Platoon is a 16-man unit that is one 
                                                 
57 Cooley, Social Organization, 23. 
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organizational level below the current Troop structure. Prior to the NSW-21 
reorganization, the SEAL Platoon was the core operational unit of NSW. Like the Troops 
of today, the Platoon trained and was organized to deploy as a stand-alone unit. The 
Platoon organizational level also meets the primary group definition; however, the new 
task organization of NSW-21 and operational requirements have the shifted to the Troop 
model. As such, NSW Platoon cohesion is not the focus of this investigation. 
The qualifier ―NSW‖ must be attached when referencing the nomenclature 
Platoon because a NSW Platoon is different from an Army Platoon. This can be 
confusing because the survey used to measure cohesion in this investigation was based on 
the Army Platoon model. The closest organizational equivalent of the Army Platoon in 
NSW is SEAL Troop. The equivalence is not in mission or training but in the number of 
assigned personnel and levels of daily interaction.  
The CPCQ was developed by Guy Siebold and Dennis Kelly and is the precursor 
to the PCI that will be used in this study. In developing the questionnaire Siebold and 
Kelly considered ―the appropriate echelon level to measure cohesion.‖58 Since this 
questionnaire was developed to measure cohesion in Army units, the study examined the 
dynamics of leadership and unit employment at the squad, Platoon, and company levels 
to determine the most appropriate level to measure cohesion. Army companies were 
found to be too large since whole Platoons are often ―cross-attached‖ and companies did 
not frequently work together as whole units. The study found the optimal level meeting 
Cooley‘s description of the primary group to be the Army Platoon (NSW Troop 
equivalent). Siebold and Kelly choose the Platoon level of organization for analysis by 
interviewing squad, Platoon, and company leaders and by examining survey results.59 
Additionally, the Platoon and NSW Troop equivalent are within the construct of the 
primary group. 
                                                 
58 Siebold and Kelly, Development of the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire, 4. 
59 Ibid. 
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IV. SETTING THE STAGE: HISTORY, ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHANGE, AND CURRENT ISSUES 
A. A SHORT HISTORY OF NSW 
1. Origins 
The Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces of today trace their heritage, as do 
many modern U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), to World War II.  Specifically, 
NSW draws upon the legacies of such units as the Amphibious Scouts and Raiders 
(Joint), Naval Combat Demolition Units (NCDU), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
Operational Swimmers, and the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT).  Each of these 
units was created to address a specific wartime requirement and of which, only the UDT 
remained after the close of the war.  The UDTs eventually provided the initial manpower 
for the establishment of the first Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) Teams in 1962. 
During World War II, these naval special operations units were predominantly 
employed in support of large amphibious invasion forces.  From North Africa during the 
first allied landings in November 1942, to the island hopping campaigns in the Pacific 
theater in 1944 and 1945, the necessity of massive amphibious landings to close with the 
enemy brought with it the requirement to scout and clear the approaches to the enemy 
beaches.60  This brought about the creation of first, the Scouts and Raiders, followed by 
the NCDUs, and finally, the UDTs.  Each new unit, despite their employment in different 
theaters—Scouts and Raiders and NCDU predominantly operated in the European theater 
and the UDTs were exclusively in the Pacific theater—built upon the lessons learned 
from the earlier units and adapted those lessons to the evolving conditions of the war.   
Perhaps the least recognized of the World War II U.S. Navy special operation 
units was the OSS Operational Swimmers, a unit that arguably had the most significant 
impact on the evolution of NSW‘s hallmark capability: combat diving.  A young medical 
student named Christian Lambertson developed the Lambertson Amphibious Respiratory 
Unit (LARU), which was the precursor to the equipment used by today‘s SEAL combat 
                                                 
60 Kevin Dockery, Navy SEALs: The Complete History, 1st ed. (New York: Berkley Books, 2004), 5. 
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divers.  Spurned by the Navy when he demonstrated his new technology for them, he 
turned to the OSS where the reception was considerably warmer, and thus was born the 
OSS Operational Swimmers.  Lambertson went on to develop tactics and techniques that 
formed the basis of combat diving doctrine for NSW that are still in prominent use 
today.61 
2. Post-World War II Era 
After defeating the Axis powers in 1945, the massive U.S. military that had been 
created to wage wars in two theaters now faced significant downsizing.  The naval 
special operations units that had performed so admirably on the invasion beachheads now 
seemed extraneous to the larger U.S. Navy.  Compounding this was the struggle for 
relevance that the Navy now faced after the defeat of the only hostile navies that posed a 
threat to the United States.62 The UDT escaped the extinction and remained intact, albeit 
with significantly reduced numbers. In an effort to remain relevant and continually push 
the envelope, the UDT men began to expand their skill set beyond their traditional role 
and learn more extensive commando skills that would light the path for the creation of 
the SEAL Teams in the near future.63 
As the first major undeclared war of the Cold War era in 1950, the Korean War 
demanded a necessary expansion in the role of the UDTs as the likelihood of major 
opposed amphibious landings in the future steadily diminished.64 Thus, the evolution of 
the naval commandos continued throughout this conflict as they became increasingly 
involved in sabotage and unconventional operations farther and farther from the high 
water line.    
                                                 
61 Orr Kelly, Brave Men - Dark Waters (Pocket, 2003), 46–49. 
62 George Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford University 
Press, 1996), 275–277. 
63 Kelly, Brave Men - Dark Waters, 59–67. 
64 The one notable exception to this was the landing at Inchon in late 1950.  Beyond this, there were 
scant opportunities for the UDT to be employed in their traditional roles. Kelly, Brave Men - Dark Waters, 
70. 
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3. Vietnam Era  
The years following the Korean War found the UDT men continuing their 
innovative work, though still in search of a specific role within the evolving US military 
structure.  The election of President John F. Kennedy in 1961 catapulted to the forefront 
the concepts of unconventional and irregular warfare that would become most closely 
associated with special operations forces.   
In response to President John F. Kennedy‘s call for increased capabilities in 
―guerrilla-style‖ warfare, the Navy commissioned two SEa, Air, and Land (SEAL) 
Teams—SEAL Team ONE in Coronado, California and SEAL Team TWO in Norfolk, 
Virginia—in January 1962.65  The test of the new unit‘s capabilities lay before them. 
All that had gone before with the UDTs, the actions in Korea, World War 
II, the Scouts and Raiders, and finally the NCDUs on Normandy Beach 
laid the groundwork for the SEALs.  Vietnam would prove what they had 
become, the finest unconventional fighting force of the United States 
military.66 
The SEALs‘ initial entry to Vietnam in 1963 began in an advisory role, as was 
part of their charter as the Navy‘s proponent for Kennedy‘s unconventional warfare 
capability.  By 1966 however, the SEALs began operating primarily in a unilateral 
capacity when they were sent to the Rung Sat Special Zone to root out Viet Cong.  
Tasked to collect intelligence and conduct reconnaissance patrols, the SEALS took 
advantage of the considerable flexibility in their guidance by expanding operations and 
the ―ambush became the primary SEAL field operation.‖67  These operations continued 
throughout the remainder of the conflict as the SEALs developed into an extremely 
proficient counter-guerrilla force that accounted for numerous devastating blows against 
the Viet Cong. 
                                                 
65 Kevin Dockery, SEALs in Action (New York: Avon, 1991), 79–82. 
66 Dockery, Navy SEALs, 255. 
67 Dockery, SEALs in Action, 93. 
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4. Post-Vietnam Era 
The era immediately following the Vietnam conflict was marked by an identity 
crisis for the SEALs and UDT.  As the SEALs had become accustomed to the riverine 
environment during the war years, the post-war years found them once again at odds with 
the blue water Navy.  There was discussion at some point of placing the active SEALs 
units in the Reserves, since the Navy perceived the special operations force to contain 
little value in its refocused preparations for a major conflict with the Soviet Union.  This 
led to a self-assessment, as the SEALs had to define their mission set and subsequently 
―sell‖ themselves to the several fleets that theirs was a necessary capability for the fleet to 
retain.68 
After narrowly escaping this brush with irrelevance, and the subsequent lean years 
of the 1970s, the following decade brought some of the most historically significant 
changes to date for all United States SOF, not just NSW.  Most important among these 
was the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act in 1986, legislation that created a unified combatant command in 
charge of all US SOF, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in 
April, 1987.69  The direct impact to Naval Special Warfare came at the same time, when  
the Naval Special Warfare Command (WARCOM) was established as the Navy‘s special 
operations component command under USSOCOM.  This resulted in more direct support 
monetarily, as the new unified command had what amounted to its own checkbook in 
Major Force Plan-11 (MFP-11).70  With the re-structuring now complete, a number of 
smaller contingency operations would provide the opportunity for SOCOM to test its 
mettle before it received its most demanding task: serving as a supported command in the 
wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
                                                 
68 Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), 65–68. 
69 Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 86–89, 145–147. 
70 Ibid., 209. 
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5. Global War on Terrorism Era 
Since the beginning of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, 
respectively, NSW has maintained an enduring presence in both conflict zones.  The 
missions that NSW forces have conducted range from the kinetic, such as targeted raids, 
to more non-kinetic, such as training partner forces in an effort to build capacity in the 
security forces of the respective countries.  NSW has played a valuable role in these 
conflicts, even in light of the fact that neither country boasts a significant, or, in the case 
of Afghanistan any, coastline, which has often been an argument against employing NSW 
forces in such places.  Nevertheless, the role of NSW has undeniably changed in 
comparison to previous conflicts.  
Looking as far back as World War II, most U.S. naval special operations units 
served very specific and often transitory needs.  The absence of sufficient stability and an 
uncertain future could, in some ways, be attributed to the manner in which these forces 
fell within the U.S. Navy hierarchy.  The focus of the Navy has, for the most part, always 
been the large ships in the fleet.  However, continuous adaptation and innovation, 
exhibited by episodic organizational change, has allowed NSW to remain relevant and 
survive, even through the lean years of post-war downsizing.  The following section 
examines the effect of the most recent of these organizational changes, Naval Special 
Warfare-21 (NSW-21), on the ability of the operational units to function as cohesive 
elements. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE: NSW-21’S IMPACT ON UNIT 
COHESION 
In 2000 and 2001, the NSW force underwent the most significant organizational 
restructuring in the nearly 60-year existence of the organization.  Dubbed NSW-21, this 
restructuring was implemented in an effort to consolidate redundant functions and 
standardize certain processes across the force.71  The aftermath of this transformation 
has, as with many major changes, had both positive and negative consequences.   
                                                 
71 Louis M. McCray and Steven K. Renly, ―Naval Special Warfare 21: An Analysis of Organizational 
Change in the 21st Century‖ (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), 1, 
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The uncertain future of conflict beyond the near horizon of Iraq and Afghanistan 
calls for SOF that are highly adaptive to the changing nature of warfare.  This suggests 
that certain centralizing features of the NSW-21 model are a paradoxical match to the 
flexible units required in an uncertain environment.  Organizational design theory 
suggests that for units that operate in environments with significant uncertainty, there 
exists an inherently high level of trust and cohesiveness among the individuals that 
comprise the unit.72  One of the preeminent organizational theorists, Henry Mintzberg, 
developed a theory that describes how organizations operating in complex and unstable 
environments—which can certainly be said of the SOF operational environments—must 
cope with high levels of uncertainty.  Such organizations cope with this complexity 
through a mechanism known as mutual adjustment.  Mutual adjustment is epitomized by 
the ability of the core operators to adapt to each other as they progress; certainly, in a 
physically hostile environment such as combat, unit cohesion is an integral part of this 
mechanism. 
1. NSW-21 Revisited 
The NSW-21 realignment was initiated to achieve five specific goals: 1) 
development of a new NSW Squadron design; 2) realignment of training; 3) restructuring 
the force; 4) optimizing command and control relationships in forward operational areas; 
and 5) creation of a new Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) backbone.73  It has been in the 
implementation of the first three of these initiatives that the most direct impact on unit 
cohesion can be found.   
a. Development of the NSW Squadron 
Almost immediately, noticeable change wrought from the NSW-21 
realignment came from the first of these initiatives: the creation of the NSW Squadron.  
This did not establish a new hierarchy; rather, it transformed the existing structure of the 
                                                 
72 Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the Research (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979). 
73 Eric H. Seeger, A Tribute to Special Operations (Tampa, FL: Faircount, 2003), 133, 199. 
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SEAL Team into a deployable entity by adding combat enablers that provided the 
headquarters element the ability to function in a deployed command and control capacity.  
Prior to this, the SEAL Team operated strictly in a ―man, train, and equip‖ capacity.  The 
intent of this was to replace the SEAL Platoon with the Squadron as NSW‘s ―core 
deployable asset.‖74   
(1) Impact on Unit Cohesion.  From a theoretical perspective, the 
impact this change has on cohesion is best understood when looking at the levels of 
analysis.  As mentioned in Chapter II, the level of analysis where cohesion prevails is at 
the primary group, in this case, the Platoon and Troop.  By placing the emphasis of the 
operational focus on the squadron under this construct, the role of the Platoon is 
somewhat diminished.  This can be perceived as an encroachment on the capabilities of 
the primary group by the secondary group, negatively impacting the group dynamic and 
possibly diminishing unit cohesion and individual morale. 
b. Realignment of Training 
As described in a previous study on the topic of NSW-21 conducted by 
Louis McCray and Steven Renly at the Naval Postgraduate School, under what was 
called the ―old organizational strategy,‖ SEAL Teams conducted the training for their 
Platoons at the team level.75  Thus, on each coast, where there were three teams under the 
old strategy, there existed the potential for three completely different products in terms of 
the standard operating procedures (SOP) and tactics that the operational elements 
practiced.  The disadvantage this presented was a limitation of the interoperability with 
Platoons from different teams.  NSW-21 changed this significantly. 
When the realignment of training occurred, the training cells organic to 
each individual team were consolidated into a single Training Detachment (TRADET), 
now located at the Group level headquarters.  TRADET would facilitate training for all 
four of the subordinate squadrons and was primarily responsible for providing training 
during Unit Level Training (ULT).  
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(1) Impact on Unit Cohesion.  The aggregate effect on cohesion 
specific to this initiative is probably negligible.  While the establishment of another 
hierarchical command structure represented a resource drain from the operational 
elements, certain economies were no doubt realized by consolidating three separate 
entities into one, albeit larger, organization.  Furthermore, the standardization of training 
provided a considerable amount of predictability for both the recipients of the training, 
the Platoon members, and the trainers themselves.  The downside of this is an 
unavoidable amount of rigidity.  The structure of an organization such as TRADET is 
suitable for the very stable training environment and thus, many of the processes become 
routine.  These arrangements make adaptation and change a more difficult endeavor.76  
Since the current operational environment is marked by enduring change, if the training 
environment is unable to keep pace, then the units receiving the training are likely to 
suffer.  At the unit level this can perpetuate what is defined in this study as a perception-
reality gap; in this particular case, the mismatch of the perception gained in training with 
the reality of operational employment.   
c. Restructuring the Force 
The third initiative of the NSW-21 transformation is marked by two major 
changes: the restructuring of the training and deployment cycle and the creation of new 
commands to support the overall initiative.  The restructuring of the training and 
deployment cycle was a necessity for the new training detachments to support pre-
deployment training.  Again, because of the more rigid nature of the supporting 
organization, the system needed to become more rigid in turn.  The training cycle was 
reconfigured so that all Squadrons now completed a two-year cycle, broken into four 
distinct six month blocks of training and deployment [professional development 
(PRODEV), unit-level training (ULT), squadron integration training (SIT), and 
deployment].  Figure 6 provides a graphical depiction of this cycle for one NSW Group. 
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In addition to the TRADETs, two new SEAL Teams—SEAL Team 
SEVEN in Coronado and SEAL Team TEN in Little Creek—and two Logistics Support 
Units (LOGSU)—responsible for maintaining and issuing operational equipment for the 
deployable squadrons—were established under the NSW-21 initiative.  The addition of 
one SEAL Team to each coast, now totaling four on each coast, allowed the two year 
training and deployment cycle to be maintained continuously.   
 
Figure 6.    Notional Training and Deployment Cycle77  
(1) Impact on Unit Cohesion.  The rigid nature of the training and 
deployment cycle under the NSW-21 initiative is one of the primary contributors to the 
issue of ―flush and fill,‖ addressed later in this chapter.  The flush and fill phenomenon 
contributes to the difficulty of the leadership to establish a cohesive unit because once a 
cycle is complete, the majority of the experienced personnel transfer out of the command, 
new personnel are brought in, and the cycle begins anew.  Furthermore, the external 
demand for experienced personnel created by the TRADETs draws from the operational 
core of the Troops, diminishing the ability of the unit to cohere across multiple iterations 
of the training and deployment cycle. While any one of these three initiatives just 
addressed is not necessarily singularly responsible for any negative impact to cohesion, 
the combination has created conditions under which cohesion may suffer in the Troops.   
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their respective deployment schedule is sensitive information.   
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2. Post NSW-21 Developments: The Only Constant Is Change 
Much has changed since the NSW-21 realignment was initiated in 2002.  Most 
prominent among these changes has been the uninterrupted state of conflict that NSW 
forces have experienced since the initiative was implemented.  From the outset, NSW-21 
has been tested under the most austere of conditions: protracted combat.  Nevertheless, 
there have been a number of necessary changes to the original concept.  The most 
important for the purposes of this study, occurred in late-2010.   
a. Change In the Training and Deployment Cycle  
Until late-2010, all NSW units assigned to Naval Special Warfare Groups 
(NSWG) ONE and TWO were on the two-year cycle described above.  This recently 
changed for both Groups in order to accommodate changing theater requirements.  The 
full cycle is still 24-months; however, instead of there being four distinct blocks, three of 
the four squadrons on each coast will train for 16 months and subsequently deploy for 
eight months, while one of the four squadrons will be on a shorter cycle of eight months 
of training and four months of deployment.78  As a result, the latter group will complete 
two of these shorter cycles for each one that the former completes. Figure 7 depicts this 
cycle graphically.  
 
Figure 7.   Current NSW Training and Deployment Cycles   
                                                 
78 Personal interview, SEAL O-4/Lt. Cmdr., February, 2011. 
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b. The Troop Is the New Platoon  
The concept of the SEAL Platoon as the primary NSW unit of action has 
prevailed since the days of the UDT in World War II, when their primary operational 
elements were comprised of two officers and 15 enlisted men.79  As the requirements for 
Operation‘s ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM increased, so, too, did the 
level of authority necessary to provide command and control (C2) over NSW elements.  
An element known as a Task Unit has long been a part of NSW doctrine, serving as a 
task organized element established for a specific operation and assigned the necessary 
elements to enable it to achieve its objective.  This element was designed for contingency 
operations and sufficed in providing C2 prior to the current state of protracted conflict; 
however, the complexity of operating in a joint environment with conventional forces 
demanded a higher level of authority.  Therefore, the Task Unit grew in permanence and 
became known as the Troop throughout the predeployment work up and now generally 
serves as NSW‘s primary maneuver element.80 
C. CURRENT ISSUES RELATED TO UNIT COHESION 
The following topics are compiled from evidence gathered from interviews 
conducted during the course of this research, the authors‘ personal experience in NSW as 
enlisted and officer members, and from survey comments.  This section addresses a 
number of wide ranging issues that serve as indicators for the absence or presence of unit 
cohesion.  This section lays the groundwork for the central issues that will be examined 
in greater detail when analyzing the survey results. 
1. “Flush and Fill” 
Despite the recent change in the training and deployment cycle, the individual 
SEALs assigned to each Troop remain together, either conducting training or in a 
deployed status, for the same 24-month period that they were under the previous training 
                                                 
79 Dockery, Navy SEALs, 79. 
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deployed and assigned to a deployed higher headquarters.  Thus, the Troop Commander becomes the Task 
Unit commander and assumes responsibility for all of the additional combat enablers.   
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and deployment cycle.  The problem lies in the fact that very little continuity exists from 
each 24-month cycle to the next, and the continuity that does exist comes from the more 
junior enlisted personnel who just completed their first deployment.  This phenomenon is 
known by the dubious title of ―flush and fill.‖ 
A by-product of the NSW-21 re-alignment, ―flush and fill‖ exists primarily due to 
the growth of the NSW force and the consequent expanding requirements, as well as the 
rigidity of the training and deployment cycle.  The effect of this issue is manifested in the 
readiness of the unit.  Following deployment and the transfer of personnel, a returning 
Troop is reduced to the lowest state of readiness until it has completed the necessary 
requirements mandated to qualify once again as combat ready.  Figure 8 illustrates a 
notional readiness cycle for a Squadron and its Troops under both the long and short 
cycle constructs.  As can be seen, the long cycle Troops suffer a significant decrease in 
readiness at the end of one training and deployment cycle; whereas, the short cycle 
Troops are able to complete two cycles and arguably, are able to gain more efficiencies 
by virtue of working together through more iterations of the cycle‘s components.  The 
potential advantages of this will be discussed in Chapter VII. 
Another concern the flush and fill issues raises is that with large numbers of 
personnel transferring out of the Troop prior to completing their first tour at the 
command, the dominant demographic within the Troops is now first-time members, or 
―new guys.‖ 81 This most likely comes as a result of the increased requirements and a 
recent decrease in retention.82 
                                                 
81 A tour for an enlisted member on his first assignment in NSW is five years.  A tour for an officer is 
two years.  Thus, an enlisted member will generally complete only two deployment cycles before moving 
to another assignment. 
82 Rear Adm. Edward G. Winters, ―Naval Special Warfare Pressure on the Force‖ (Naval Special 
Warfare Command Presentation, Coronado, CA, January 26, 2011), Slide 2, 4. 
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Figure 8.    Squadron and Troop Readiness  
2. Retention 
The issue of retention is also related to unit cohesion, though this relationship is 
not necessarily indicated by a causal relationship.  Any discussion of the relationship 
between the issues of cohesion and retention runs the risk of falling prey to the chicken or 
the egg dilemma.  The questions raised are: Are Troops less cohesive because there is 
greater turnover, resulting in less experienced and potentially less qualified operators?  
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Or, are more people getting out because the units are not as closely knit and there is less 
nonmaterial incentive to retain them?  Recent research suggests the former.  A Quick 
Poll, conducted by the Navy Personnel, Research, Studies & Technology (NPRST) in 
early 2010 revealed that the top three reasons for both SEAL officers and enlisted to 
leave the Navy were: 1) Time spent away from home (officers–72%; enlisted-60%), 2) 
Impact of Navy on family (officer-68%; enlisted-53%), and 3) Balance between work 
and personal time (officer-58%; enlisted-49%).83   
Although this research does not suggest a direct causal relationship with unit 
cohesion, there are studies that hypothesize a correlation between increased turnover and 
a decrease in group cohesiveness.84 The idea being that as larger numbers of experienced 
SEALs make the decision to leave the military, there will be a void that can likely only be 
filled by lesser experienced individuals.  Thus, a drop in retention of experienced SEALs, 
even though it does not directly influence a decline in unit cohesion, can perpetuate a 
decline if cohesion is already low, or if there is some other factor at work against 
cohesion. 
3. Meaningful Employment 
The concept of meaningful employment refers to the internal perception by 
individuals within the operational units that they are being employed in a manner 
representative of their unit‘s skill level.  One needs to look only at the word ―perception‖ 
to understand that this is largely a subjective concept.  Therefore, measuring its impact 
empirically proves exceedingly difficult. 
The 2010 Quick Poll, conducted by the NPRST, also found that the most 
important factor contributing to increased command morale was ―operational 
                                                 
83 Carol Newell, Kimberly Whittam, and Zannette Uriell, ―2010 SEAL/SWCC/EOD/Divers Retention 
Quick Poll‖, April 29, 2010, Slides 18–23. 
84 Jennifer George, ―Understanding Prosocial Behavior, Sales Performance, and Turnover: A Group-
Level Analysis in a Service Context,‖ Journal of Applied Psychology 75, no. 6 (December 1990): 700. 
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employment.‖85  Still, this does not alleviate the subjectivity of the concept; it merely 
confirms the existence of a correlation between ―command morale‖ and the perception of 
meaningful employment. Any reference to this issue might be a stronger indicator of 
issues with unit leadership in managing expectations than of an actual value judgment on 
a unit‘s operational employment. Both authors have experienced deployments to 
locations that were deemed less than optimal, yet the units associated with the mission 
exhibited relatively high levels of cohesiveness. 
In describing the issue of meaningful employment, one SEAL officer said that it 
is not so much the actual employment that is the concern as is the perceived value of the 
employment held by certain ―internal haves and have-nots‖ at the commands. This refers 
to the belief resident in certain elements that different units within the Squadron, the 
Group, or even NSW as a whole might be receiving a ―better deal‖ regarding their 
deployment location. By this rationale, the issue of meaningful employment is actually 
better understood as a matter of perception, or expectation, management.86  Additionally, 
this is similarly related to the concept of hardiness, described in Chapters II and III.  
Specifically, in the sense that high-hardy leaders are able to convey to their men the 
importance of their mission under what might be viewed as less than desirable 
employment conditions.  While this addresses the issue of leadership ability to manage 
expectations, it does not address the root of the problem: how the initial perceptions of 
operational employment were established. 
4. Perception-Reality Gap 
Closely related to meaningful employment and expectation management is a 
concept developed in the course of this research dubbed the perception-reality gap.  This 
                                                 
85 Newell, Whittam, and Uriell, ―2010 SEAL/SWCC/EOD/Divers Retention Quick Poll,‖ Slide 14. No 
definition of "Operational Employment" was provided, though it is reasonable to assume the terms 
meaningful employment and operational employment can be used synonymously in this context.  
Additionally, the terminology of "command morale" is slightly different than what has been defined thus 
far in this study.  In Chapter II, morale was defined as an individual trait, while something existing at the 
command level, or the secondary group, would be defined as esprit de corps.  According to the framework 
established in this study, this reference to "command morale" most fittingly equates to the concept of unit 
cohesion. 
86 Personal interview, SEAL O-5/Cmdr., February, 2011. 
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issue seemed to resonate with most interviewees as one of the most, if not the most, 
important issues related to unit cohesion.  This gap begins with what one interviewee 
called ―false advertising,‖ stating that everything SEAL candidates and trainees are 
exposed to—from recruiting videos to literature concerning NSW—emphasizes the 
kinetic aspect of special operations.87  This is continually reinforced through SEAL 
Qualification Training—where candidates complete the crucible of initial training and 
receive their Special Warfare insignia, the Trident—and Unit Level Training once they 
arrive at their first command.  Potentially, a young SEAL might never even be exposed to 
a mission such as Foreign Internal Defense (FID)88—predominately a non-kinetic 
activity—until deployment.  Yet, these missions are commonly assigned to deploying 
NSW units, despite the lack of proper preparation for such missions. 
The concept of expectation management becomes crucially important here 
because, left unmanaged, a young SEAL‘s perception of what NSW does when its forces 
deploy will rely solely on the ―false advertising‖ and the conditioning to kinetic action 
that prevails throughout training.  Without continual expectation management on the part 
of the unit leaders, the perception-reality gap risks becoming toxic to unit cohesion once 
reality sets in. However, this seems incongruous that the expectations of members of an 
elite combat unit should have to be suppressed prior to deploying to a combat theater; 
furthermore, this hints at larger organizational inconsistencies that the burden of this task 
should fall on the tactical leaders alone.  
5. Leadership 
Building upon the levels of analysis introduced in Chapter II, the leadership of 
each group—primary and secondary—shares the burden of ensuring the effectiveness of 
their particular charges.  In the broadest sense, the leadership at various levels has the 
responsibility of implementing, communicating, and, if necessary, recommending 
                                                 
87 Personal interview, SEAL O-5/Cmdr. (select), February, 2011. 
88 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 30, 2004), ix. The 
Joint Publication defines FID as ―... the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in 
any of the action programs taken by another government or designated organization, to free and protect its 
society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.‖ 
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changes to the organization‘s vision and mission.  A breakdown in any one of these 
leadership tasks can have tremendous effects on unit cohesion. 
a. Secondary Group Leadership 
Secondary group leadership refers to all of the levels of leadership above 
the Troop level.  Specific to NSW, this begins with the strategic vision established at the 
force level.  This vision should articulate a future-oriented concept of what the 
organization‘s roles are within the larger SOF community and, most importantly, should 
be ―...consistent with (the organization‘s) actual capabilities.‖89  This last part is 
important and is related to some of the larger issues within NSW.   
Some of the more significant issues discussed in the interviews include the 
lack of predictability, uncertainty of what the future may hold for the force, and the sense 
that the leadership continually volunteers an already overstretched force for additional 
commitments.90  This point, in particular, is exacerbated when that commitment may not 
fall in line with the perceived capabilities of the operational units.  All of these, but 
particularly unpredictability and uncertainty, are significant indicators of, at best, poor 
communication of a strategic vision and, at worst, the lack of a coherent strategic vision.   
b. Primary Group Leadership 
Primary group leadership refers to the leadership at the Troop and Platoon 
level. The impact that this demographic has on unit cohesion becomes one of the 
linchpins in the determination of the operational element‘s success or failure. As 
mentioned previously in this section, the primary group leaders must manage the ―gap‖ 
between what is perceived and what is real. Accordingly, the larger the gap, the greater 
the burden is that is placed on the Troop and Platoon leadership to unite their men to 
accomplish the assigned mission. 
                                                 
89 Edwin A. Locke, The Essence of Leadership: The Four Keys to Leading Successfully (Lexington 
Books, 1991), 56. 
90 Personal interview, SEAL O-4/Lt. Cmdr., February, 2011; Personal interview, SEAL O-5/Cmdr., 
February, 2011; Personal interview, SEAL E-8/Sen. Chief, March, 2011 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the relatively brief history of NSW, many changes have adjusted the 
direction of the force‘s development; however, among the most important concepts 
unaltered by the changes has been the culture and spirit of the organization. Innovation, 
adaptability, performance under the most austere of conditions; these indicators have 
been the hallmark of Naval Special Warfare since its inception. Today‘s conflict 
environment provides a significant demand signal for the capabilities that have 
historically been, and continue to be, the specialty of NSW operational elements; yet, 
there are still indicators of negative impacts to unit cohesion. If this is so, then why are 
the operators seemingly unhappy? The next chapter introduces how this question might 
be answered.  
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V. SURVEYS AND INTERVIEWS 
The primary means of data collection for this study was achieved by a survey 
questionnaire administered to each operational Troop within Naval Special Warfare 
(NSW).  Qualitative data to supplement the quantitative survey results was gathered 
through a series of personal interviews with senior officer and enlisted leaders external to 
the Troops.   
A. SURVEY 
The primary method of data collection used for this study was survey research.  A 
large-n (approximately 900 NSW operators), cross-sectional methodology was employed 
in the form of a survey questionnaire.
91
  By definition, a survey is a cross-sectional study; 
however, due to the cyclical nature of the rotations of NSW units discussed in Chapter 
IV, the data can also be viewed in a manner somewhat analogous to a time-series study.  
Though the study was not able to follow a specific unit, or group of units over time, the 
unique nature of the current training-deployment cycle provided a longitudinal snapshot 
of Troops in the phases of the training-deployment cycle. This cycle, and the nearly 
uniform training curriculum, provides a time series-like study in addition to the cross-
sectional method.  Obviously, this time series-like method does not account for the 
characteristics of each of the individuals that comprise the unit, which would be a factor 
in a true time-series study. However, given that the focus of this study is on the primary 
group, not the individual, this method offers greater applicability for the force overall.   
1. Survey Components and Design 
The survey is comprised of three sections: a section adapted from the Platoon 
Cohesion Index (PCI), developed by Guy L. Siebold and Dennis R. Kelly, researchers at 
the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences; the Dispositional 
 
                                                 
91 This study limits the population of the survey to members of SEAL Troops within operational NSW 
Squadrons.  This is not to minimize the importance of the other operational elements of the NSW 
community, i.e., Special Boat Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams, and Support Activities, but to 
provide an in depth study of one particular unit.  
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Resilience Scale (DRS) developed by Paul T. Bartone; and questions developed by the 
authors that reflect aspects of cohesion that are unique to NSW.  Refer to Appendix A for 
a copy of the survey. 
a. Platoon Cohesion Index 
Siebold and Kelly developed the Platoon Cohesion Index (PCI) in 1988 as 
a condensed version of the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire (CPCQ). The CPCQ 
is a 98-item questionnaire designed to examine the direction of cohesion, or bonding, 
within the unit being studied.  Specifically, the questions look at the 1) superior-
subordinate relationship, or vertical bonding; 2) peer-to-peer relationships, or horizontal 
bonding; and 3) the relationship between the individual and the parent organization, or 
organizational bonding.  Each of these relationships exhibits two aspects: affective (the 
emotional or feeling aspect) and instrumental (the task or functional aspect).92  The nexus 
of these relationships and their aspects provide the basis for Siebold and Kelly‘s research. 
The PCI retains the same components developed for the CPCQ in a 
truncated form.  This was designed to provide the unit with a useful and not unwieldy 
tool for self-assessment.93  The components and the corresponding questions in both the 
PCI and the NSW Unit Cohesion survey are displayed in Table 2.   
The version of the PCI utilized for this research, while similar in content, 
was administered in a more simplified form than the original developers of the index 
administered their survey.  Specifically, the original PCI was given to the members of 
Army light and mechanized infantry Platoons and the respective company leadership 
(officer and senior enlisted) was given a corresponding questionnaire that provided an 
external assessment of the same variables being examined at the individual level.94  The 
authors of this study chose to limit this study to a survey given to the entire operational 
Troop—leadership and members—in order to simplify matters.  This feature in the 
original implementation of the survey was done primarily to provide internal validity to 
                                                 
92 Siebold and Kelly, Development of the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire, 2. 
93 Ibid., 1. 
94 Ibid., 7. 
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the PCI questionnaire.  Since the validity of the construct has been established, it was not 
necessary for the purposes of this study to repeat that particular aspect of the research.95  
 
CPCQ/PCI Scales PCI Items NSW Survey 
Items 
Horizontal Bonding (HB) 
 HB-Affective (HB-A) 3, 4 3.1.3, 3.1.4 
 HB-Affective, Leaders (HB-A,L) 7, 8 3.1.7, 3.1.8 
 HB-Instrumental (HB-I) 5, 6 3.1.5, 3.1.6 
Vertical Bonding (VB) 
 VB-Affective (VB-A) 9, 10 3.1.9, 3.1.10 
 VB-Instrumental (VB-I) 11, 12 3.1.11, 3.1.12 
Organizational Bonding (OB) 
 OB-Affective, Member Values (OB-A,MV) 1 3.1.1 
 OB-Affective, Leader Values (OB-A,LV) 2 3.1.2 
 OB-Affective, Pride (OB-A,P) 15, 16 3.1.15, 3.1.16 
 OB-Instrumental, Anomie (OB-I,A) 13, 14 3.1.13, 3.1.14 
 OB-Instrumental (OB-I,N) 17, 18 3.1.17, 3.1.18 
 OB-Instrumental, Goals (OB-I,G) 19, 20 3.1.19, 3.1.20 
Table 2.   PCI and NSW Unit Cohesion Survey Scales96 
b. Dispositional Resilience Scale (DRS) 
The DRS-15 was developed by Dr. Paul T. Bartone and refined over 25 
years of research on the subject.  The DRS-15 is a shorter version of two other scales (45 
and 30 item questionnaires), which examines the personality quality described as 
hardiness.  The DRS-15, used in the research for this study, has been validated through 
numerous studies involving many demographic groups, including military special 
operations units.97   
As with the majority of the contemporary research on the subject of 
hardiness, the DRS-15 examines the factors of commitment, control, and challenge. 
                                                 
95 Siebold and Kelly, Development of the Platoon Cohesion Index, 14. 
96 Siebold and Kelly, Development of the Platoon Cohesion Index, 5. Adapted from Table 1 on the 
referenced page. For a full description of each of the variables refer to the table in Appendix B. The PCI 
uses the term ―First Termer‘s;‖ in the NSW Unit Cohesion survey the term ―Member‖ is used in its place. 
97 Bartone et al., ―Psychological Hardiness Predicts Success in US Army Special Forces Candidates.‖ 
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Commitment is the tendency to see the world as interesting and 
meaningful. Control is the belief in one‘s own ability to control or 
influence events. Challenge involves seeing change and new experiences 
as exciting opportunities to learn and develop.98 
The DRS-15 appears in the NSW Unit Cohesion Survey in Section 1, 
questions 1 – 15 (See Appendix A).  
c. Additional Questions 
The remaining questions focus on the additional factors identified in 
Chapter IV: leadership and selection and training.  Three components are examined 
within the leadership aspect: leadership‘s ability to deal with adversity, leadership‘s 
compassion, and member confidence in the Troop‘s leadership in combat.  Additionally, 
the authors sought to examine the factors leading to the higher hypothesized levels of 
cohesion within National Mission Force (NMF) Troops compared to (TMF) Theater 
Mission Force Troops; thus, the primary factor differentiating the two: selection and 
training, is examined in this section as well.  Figure 9 provides a graphical representation 
of how the theory, described in Chapter III, informs each of the survey components 
addressed above. 
                                                 




Figure 9.    Survey Design and NSW Unit Cohesion Theory  
2. Survey Distribution 
The electronic survey was distributed to approximately 800 Troop members 
assigned to SEAL Teams within Naval Special Warfare Groups (NSWG) ONE and 
TWO.  In an effort to maintain the anonymity of the respondents, the hyperlinks for the 
survey were sent to the Executive Officer (XO) at each SEAL Team for the XO to 
distribute to their respective Troops.  The data was then collected on the online database 
 52 
to which only the researchers had access. Additionally, a hard copy version of the survey 
was sent to a representative at the NMF for distribution to potential respondents there. 
B. INTERVIEWS 
Similar in concept to the external review conducted in the PCI, interviews with 
mid to senior-level SEAL enlisted and officer leaders were conducted in an effort to 
supplement the quantitative results drawn from the survey.  The intent of the interview 
was twofold; first, it was designed to establish a consensus of the primary issues within 
NSW that are related to unit cohesion and second, it serves as a form of external 
validation for the survey results.  The results of the interviews will be examined in more 
detail in Chapter VI. 
The structure of the interview was designed to provide an overarching view of 
some of the current issues within NSW that are related to the concept of unit cohesion.  
Because of the varying interpretations of what exactly unit cohesion is, it was first 
necessary to establish a common baseline for analysis by having each interviewee 
provide their definition of unit cohesion and how it relates to performance.  Next, 
respondents were asked to discuss the most significant issues facing the NSW community 
and their relationship to unit cohesion.  Respondents were then asked to provide their 
opinion regarding potential remedies for the issues they addressed.  Finally, each 
respondent was given an opportunity to address anything else related to unit cohesion that 
had not yet been addressed.  Refer to Appendix C for a copy of the interview form. 
C. RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
The most significant challenge the authors faced in collecting data was getting 
access to potential respondents.  Due to the substantial operational tempo of NSW forces, 
gaining access to a large audience at any one time to provide an overview of the research 
proved difficult.  Furthermore, there was virtually no access to the deployed NSW units, 
which account for approximately one-third of the sample population.  This resulted in 
briefing only a limited audience—generally, Troop or Platoon leadership of non-
deployed Troops—and petitioning them to serve as advocates on behalf of the 
researchers.  Given the requirements the current conflicts impose, this method 
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undoubtedly affected the response rate; however, the number of responses received still 
provided sufficient feedback to investigate the majority of the variables. 
1. Recommendations for Future Researchers 
a. Access to Respondents 
Being that this study was conducted at the unclassified level, nearly all of 
the correspondence was thus conducted in the unclassified realm, including the survey 
distribution.  However, NSW units conduct most of their daily business on the Secret 
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRnet), a classified network utilized primarily by 
the Department of Defense.  By distributing the survey via this medium, the likelihood of 
obtaining more survey responses would have undoubtedly been increased.  Furthermore, 
this would have provided greater access to the deployed NSW units who regularly 
operate on classified networks.  Although this would make it more difficult to transfer the 
data between the classified and unclassified domains for analysis, the value gained from 
the greater volume and distribution of responses would likely offset any disadvantages 
presented. 
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VI. RESEARCH RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The questionnaire used in this study built upon two previously validated and 
widely utilized surveys: the 1988 Platoon Cohesion Index (PCI) and the 1995 
Dispositional Resilience Scale-15 (DRS-15). In conjunction with the PCI and the DRS-
15, this study sought to explore how the four primary leadership positions (Troop 
Commander, Troop Chief, Platoon Commander, and Platoon Chief) within a Naval 
Special Warfare (NSW) Troop affect cohesion. Each position was compared along the 
dimensions of ability to cope with adversity, compassion for subordinates, and combat 
leadership.  
The survey targeted two broad groups within NSW: Theater Mission Forces 
(TMF) and National Mission Forces (NMF). Within the TMF, two Naval Special Warfare 
Groups (NSWG) were polled, NSWG ONE and NSWG TWO. Due to heightened 
operational requirements, access to and responses from the NMF were limited. Thus, the 
data recovered from this group was largely negligible and incorporated only in the 
analysis of the overall NSW force. This lack of data prevented a more thorough 
examination of Hypothesis #3, which posited that units with additional and more arduous 
selection and training criteria would exhibit increased levels of cohesion within the 
operational elements. However, despite the inability to study this particular hypothesis, 
the majority of the remaining data provided interesting insights into the dynamics of unit 
cohesion in NSW Troops. 
The survey itself included a quantitative portion and a qualitative portion. The 
quantitative section comprised the majority of the overall survey and sought to explore 
the dynamics of the NSW Troop at the primary group level of analysis. The qualitative 
portion, which consisted of open field comment blocks largely sought to further explore 
the current issues in NSW and offer explanations of their relationship to NSW Troop 
cohesion. 
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For the purposes of the quantitative portion, descriptive statistics and regression 
analysis were used to examine the variables hypothesized to contribute to unit cohesion 
in NSW Troops.  The following sections discuss the results of the statistical analysis and 
the comparative elements of this study with the previously established survey 
questionnaires.99 
1. Statistical Analysis Overview 
The PCI and the DRS-15 provided valuable data for the analysis of NSW unit 
cohesion; however, this integration of two previously established questionnaires did not 
come without challenges.  The respective scales utilized in the PCI and the DRS-15 are 
markedly different from one another.  The PCI utilizes a five-point Likert scale ranging 
from a response of ―Strongly Agree‖ with a corresponding value of +2, to ―Strongly 
Disagree‖ with a corresponding value of –2.100 The DRS-15 utilizes a discrete, four-point 
scale ranging from the negative response of ―Not True at All,‖ to the two intermediate 
responses, ―A Little True‖ and ―Quite True,‖ to the positive response of ―Completely 
True.‖  In an effort to maintain as much consistency as possible within the survey, the 
author-developed questions on leadership maintained the same scale as the PCI.  
In order to conduct a more nuanced examination of the relationships between the 
variables, the respondents were grouped in a number of different categories based on the 
demographic data provided. These primary subgroups correspond with the geographical 
location of the commands: West Coast (NSWG ONE forces) and East Coast (NSWG 
TWO forces).  Additionally, distinctions are made between officer, senior enlisted, and 
enlisted respondents; this is done primarily to glean information relevant to the leadership 
aspect of this study. 
One of the challenges in designing a survey with differing scales was determining 
the best way to compare the results once they were collected. This factor, in particular, 
prevented a direct comparison of the averaged responses between the variable of 
                                                 
99 Stata Statistical Software: Release 10 (College Station, TX: StataCorp LP, 2007). 
100 There were no ratings for the three intermediate scale choices. The intent was to offer more 
flexibility for the respondent by providing for a continuous, vice discrete, assessment of the questions. 
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hardiness, collected from the DRS-15, and the rest of the independent variables, gathered 
from the PCI and the author-generated questions. This is less important to the overall 
analysis as correlation and regression offer a scale-free analysis of the interaction 
between the observed variables. The only shortfall comes when observing the descriptive 
statistics and attempting to draw direct comparisons to the hypothesized variables 
contributing to NSW Troop unit cohesion. Table 3  provides the descriptive statistics for 
each of this study‘s independent variables. 
 




Troop Commander 1.563 .715 
Troop Chief  1.386 .995 
Platoon Commander 1.681 .548 
Platoon Chief  1.639 .594 
Task Cohesion 1.479 .784 
Social Cohesion 1.352 .878 






 Hardiness values range, on a four-point scale, from 0 to 3; in contrast to the values for the other 
variables presented in this table that range, on a five point scale, from -2 to +2. 
**
 The scale for the set of variables goes from negative 2 to positive 2; thus, the standard deviation can 
be seen as an absolute value. This also explains why the standard deviation is greater, in non-negative 
terms, than the mean.  It should also be noted that this variable, though shown in this table, is missing the 
key component of having polled the NMF in order to establish a distinction between the NMF and the TMF 
on the basis of selection and training. 
Table 3.   Independent Variables Means and Standard Deviations 
In order to examine the variables in a more direct manner, the scales 
corresponding to the PCI and DRS-15 were adjusted to provide a more constructive 
analysis of the means in Table 3 above. Additionally, the variable of leadership was 
consolidated into one mean to assist in the direct comparison. 
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Variable Mean Adjusted Mean
* 
Leadership   1.567
** 3.567 
Task Cohesion 1.479 3.479 
Social Cohesion 1.352 3.352 
Hardiness 2.273 3.031 
Selection & Training .258 2.258 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 
*
 Because the PCI used a scale that incorporated negative numbers, the absolute value of the responses 
were used.  Simply adding 2 to each of the means from the PCI and author-generated questions resolved 
this issue.  Additionally, the scales between the PCI (a scale of 4) and the DRS-15 (a scale of 3) were 
normalized to the PCI and author generated scale. 
**
 This number represents the mean of the consolidated leadership variables for each level of 
leadership, taken from the Table 3 values of 1.563, 1.386, 1.681, 1.639. 
Table 4.   Adjusted Means 
Table 4 provides a much more distinct way to observe the impact of the 
hypothesized factors that contribute to unit cohesion. With the adjusted means, aligned 
along a scale of 0 to 4, one can now see that the consolidated Leadership variable 
received the highest levels in survey responses, while Selection and Training received the 
lowest levels. This is not surprising given the missing component of the NMF responses 
that were critical to the study of this particular variable. The remaining variables, ranked 
from higher to lower significance, are Task Cohesion, Social Cohesion, and Hardiness. 
Not appearing in the table but significant to more refined analysis are the sub-
components of leadership. Drawing from Table 3, the adjusted means of the leadership 
sub-components, in rank order, are: Platoon Commander, Platoon Chief, Troop 
Commander, and Troop Chief. 
From this analysis, it is important to discuss the concept of the primary and 
secondary groups introduced in Chapter II. The results from the leadership sub-
components suggest that perhaps the attraction to the group is not isolated within discrete 
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groups such as the primary and secondary; rather, the larger group may have smaller 
subgroups that exert greater influence on the individual.101  
2. Sample Validity 
In order to demonstrate the representativeness of the survey data, a sample from 
each geographic subgroup—West Coast and East Coast—was taken by using the Troops 
with the highest response rate within each subgroup. Figures 10 and 11 provide visual 
comparisons of the important variables from the sample population with the greater 
subgroup. 
 
Figure 10.   NSW West Coast Sample Validity 
                                                 
101 This assertion is derived from the adjusted means of the Platoon and Troop leadership mentioned 
above; the Platoon leadership adjusted means were significantly higher than the Troop leadership adjusted 
means, suggesting that there exists a greater affinity for the group leadership the closer that level of 
leadership is to the individual. 
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Figure 11.   NSW East Coast Sample Validity 
As the figures demonstrate, the samples for both subgroups are fairly 
representative of the overall responses.  The most significant differences are found in the 
Selection and Training variable and with some of the Leadership variables. As mentioned 
previously, the significance of the Selection and Training variable is minimal due to the 
limited responses from the NMF. However, the wide variance between both samples and 
the sub groups is interesting and may be attributable to more than simple anomaly. The 
reasons for the slight variance in the responses to the leadership variables are more easily 
explained. Across the broader subgroups, the number of individuals representing the 
leadership levels being assessed are numerous; whereas within the sample groups there 
are only two individuals—in the case of the Platoon Commander and Platoon Chief—and 




assessed for each level of leadership. Despite the perceived visual difference, these 
sample variables all fall within the acceptable range of statistical deviation and are thus 
quite representative of the subgroups.  
3. External Sample Validity 
Because portions of this research were taken from previously conducted studies—
the DRS-15 and the PCI—it is necessary to examine the comparative nature of those two 
studies‘ results with the results from NSW Unit Cohesion Survey in order to determine if 
the responses in fact provide a statistically accurate representation. This was done by 
comparing the scores retrieved from the NSW Unit Cohesion Survey with the descriptive 
statistics published by the authors of both of the original studies.  
a. DRS-15 
The results of the NSW Unit Cohesion Survey that measure the hardiness 
factor provide considerable credibility to the assertions regarding the interplay of 
hardiness and unit cohesion in NSW Troops.  The comparison of the NSW hardiness 
scores with the overall norms for adult males published by Dr. Paul Bartone reveal that 
the NSW community is comprised of above-average high-hardy individuals.102 The 
scores of the sub-components of commitment, control, and challenge that comprise 
hardiness are presented graphically in Figure 12. 
The distribution of the scores from the NSW study is comparable to the 
norms for the DRS-15, with the only apparent deviation being a slightly higher score for 
the control variable. As noted in Chapter V, control is ―the belief in one‘s own ability to 
control or influence events.‖103 One possible explanation of this slight incongruity may 
be that this particular trait is more often present in self-selected individuals who have 
overcome the significant barriers to entry of such an organization, as the members of 
                                                 
102 When the authors received authorization to utilize the DRS-15, they were provided documentation 
that provided the norms that are used in the analysis mentioned in this chapter. The overall mean for the 
DRS-15 norms for adult males is 30.345, whereas the mean for NSW hardiness is 34.089, just under four 
points higher on a 0 to 45 scale.   
103 Bartone, ―Hardiness-Resilience.com.‖ 
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NSW Troops are. Nonetheless, the norms for NSW hardiness establish sufficient validity 
for the study when compared to the originally published work. 
 
Figure 12.   DRS-15 Comparison 
In addition to the overall NSW norms, the sub-component of officer 
leadership with respect to hardiness was examined and revealed that the hardiness scores 
for these levels of leadership were slightly above the NSW norm.104 This triadic 
relationship between hardiness, leadership, and cohesion proves particularly significant 
and will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter when the regression analysis 
results are discussed. 
                                                 
104 The means for NSW officers (n=48) were: Commitment 11.833, Control 12.979, Challenge 
10.083, and Overall Hardiness 34.895. 
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b. PCI 
Similar to the DRS-15 results, the comparison between the NSW survey 
and the PCI norms revealed much higher results in the NSW sample and a similar 
adherence to the trends of the original study. This would indicate, with some level of 
certainty, that the results from the NSW survey provide a reasonably accurate depiction 
of the dynamics of cohesion examined throughout this particular portion of the 
questionnaire. Figure 13  provides a graphical comparison between the original 
questionnaire and the NSW survey of each PCI item. 
 
Figure 13.   PCI Comparison 
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c. Comparative Analysis 
The substantive validity of both the PCI and the DRS-15 questionnaires 
was reinforced by the results of the NSW Unit Cohesion Survey.  Though there are 
significant differences between the means of the original PCI and the corresponding 
responses gathered during the NSW survey, the standard deviations for the studies were 
not significantly different. This suggests that there are much higher levels of hardiness 
and cohesion among NSW operational elements and the similar values of standard 
deviation highlight the representativeness between the populations.105 While this 
provides statistical validity to the research itself, it requires a bit of educated speculation 
to get to the explanatory value of the comparison. 
The question this raises then is: What accounts for the higher levels of 
both hardiness and cohesion in NSW operational units? To the first question on 
hardiness, a higher score for the mean of the sub-component ―control‖ might suggest that 
this individual trait may already be inherent in those who self-select for the initial NSW 
training program; or, that this trait is in some way nurtured through the crucible of 
training, particularly in the leadership. On the question of the higher levels of cohesion, 
one possible answer could indicate a relationship with selection and training.  
The original study conducted by Dr. Guy Seibold and Dr. Dennis Kelly 
that developed the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire (CPCQ) into the PCI—
discussed in Chapter V—surveyed 752 members of conventional Army light infantry 
Platoons.106 The standard training for a member of these conventional units is 
considerably shorter and, by comparison, less demanding, both physically and mentally, 
than accession programs for, not just NSW, but most Special Operation Forces (SOF). 
Additionally, most conventional forces structure their units in an effort to maximize the 
―mass‖ principle of war and are thus willing to accept reduced quality with respect to 
individual preparedness in exchange for quantity. This factor alone could account for the 
higher scores within the more selectively screened and trained NSW forces.  However, 
                                                 
105 Refer to Table 9 in Appendix D for the comparative summary statistics for the PCI portion of the 
questionnaire. 
106 Siebold and Kelly, Development of the Platoon Cohesion Index, 8. 
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without the benefit of the NMF responses to examine this hypothesis further, this 
discussion remains in the realm of speculation and conjecture, though it certainly offers 
promising avenues for future research. 
B. CORRELATION 
The following section examines the correlation discovered in the study of unit 
cohesion in NSW Troops.107 The analysis is centered on three key relationships found 
within the data: (1) the relationship between two key independent variables, social and 
task cohesion; (2) the relationship between the overall results for cohesion and the 
leadership variables; and (3) the unique relationships between the levels of leadership 
within a NSW Troop. 
 
 
                                                 
107 Correlation is a statistical method that describes the nature of the relationship between two 
variables. These relationships are described in a correlation matrix, which assigns values, or correlation 
coefficients, to the intersection of two variables and can provide an understanding of the manner in which 
these variables interact. The squared value of the coefficient – called the coefficient of determination, or r2 
– can be seen as a percentage of the common variation between two variables. Simply put, the r2 value 
describes the proportion of the time that the change in two variables is related to one another. In this sense, 
the higher the value of r2, the greater dependence the variables share and vice versa. If a correlation 
coefficient is zero then the r2 will also be zero. This represents a condition called statistical independence, 
meaning that the change in one variable has no affect on the other variable and that any change is 
coincidental. Conversely, if the correlation coefficient is 1, then the two variables are perfectly correlated 
and any change in one variable is proportional to the change in the corresponding variable. Thomas Hill 
and Paul Lewicki, Statistics: Methods and Applications (Tulsa, OK: StatSoft, Inc., 2006), 
http://statsoft.com/textbook/. 
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1. NSW Unit Cohesion Overall Correlation 





















Cohesion 1.000             
Hardiness .411 1.000            
Trp CDR  .659 .460 1.000           
Trp Chief .649 .417 .781 1.000          
Plt CDR  .639 .431 .675 .535 1.000         
Plt Chief .509 .448 .604 .587 .741 1.000        
Sel & Trng .425 .165 .336 .290 .281 .220 1.000       
T-Cohesion .480 .308 .343 .359 .411 .356 .250 1.000      
S-Cohesion .527 .317 .428 .423 .442 .359 .314 .946 1.000     
NSW Yrs  .028 .042 .122 .137 .097 .111 -.311 .144 .131 1.000    
SQDN Yrs -.162 -.155 -.211 -.154 -.123 -.213 -.238 -.066 -.114 .260 1.000   
TRP yrs -.216 -.110 -.315 -.270 -.197 -.227 -.200 -.160 -.209 .008 .591 1.000  
Table 5.   Overall Variable Correlation Matrix
 67 
Table 5 provides some interesting insights into the dynamic interrelation between 
the variables examined in the overall model for NSW Troop unit cohesion. The most 
notable of these is the high correlation between task cohesion and social cohesion. The 
data indicates that nearly 90% of the time, a change in either task or social cohesion will 
correspond to a change in the other variable.108 This highly correlative nature suggests a 
close relationship between the concepts of ―work and play,‖ vis-à-vis the NSW 
community. Although this is intriguing in its own right, the high correlation presents 
difficulty when examining the variables together during regression analysis.  This will be 
discussed further in the section on regression.  
As noted in an earlier section of this chapter, the relationship between leadership 
and cohesion is significant and the results of this correlation provide additional 
justification to that hypothesis. By observing the leadership variables as a collective, it 
can be seen that around 40% of the change in levels of cohesion within a Troop 
correspond to changes in the leadership variable. Specifically, this change in cohesion 
relates to the factors examined within the leadership construct developed in this study: a 
leader‘s ability to cope with adversity, compassion for subordinates, and ability to 
perform leadership functions in a combat capacity. 
Extending the factors of leadership a bit farther, one can see that the relationships 
between leaders are highly correlated as well. While the relationship between all of the 
leaders appears significant in its own right, the relationship between the leaders at each 
level of leadership is even more interesting. For instance, take the Platoon level of 
leadership, represented here by the Platoon commander and the Platoon chief. The 
relationship between the two senior leaders at the Platoon level indicates that their actions 
are aligned with respect to the three variables defined within the leadership construct. The 
same holds true at the Troop level, to an even greater degree. This indicates that NSW 
leadership at the Troop level and below is functioning efficiently; furthermore, the extent 
of that efficiency has a significant impact on unit cohesion. 
                                                 
108 This percentage, described at the beginning of this section on correlation, is determined by 
squaring the correlation coefficient of .946 (refer to Table 5) to get an r
2
 value of .89, or 89%. 
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C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
1. Overall Model 
The initial and baseline regression analysis compared overall Troop cohesion with 
the four primary leadership positions through regression analysis. The analysis, in Table 
12 (Appendix D), showed the Platoon Commander has the most significant positive 
impact on unit cohesion within the Troop. Following the Platoon Commander, the Troop 
Chief has a large impact on Troop cohesion. Further, the analysis shows that the Platoon 
chief has the least influential impact on cohesion of the four levels of leadership.109 The 
results of this analysis show that collectively, leadership within the Troop has meaningful 
and significant impact on Troop cohesion, specifically the Platoon Commander and the 
Troop Chief. 
From the above evaluation, another regression analysis was conducted adding 
variables encompassing the four hypotheses of this study: social cohesion, task cohesion, 
hardiness, and selection and training. The analysis in Table 13 (Appendix D) shows that 
Troop leadership continued to make large contributions to this revised cohesion model. 
Additionally, this analysis shows that the level of selection and training factor affects 
levels of cohesion positively. Like the previous analysis, both the Platoon Commander 
and Troop Chief stood out as the primary influencers in the leadership category. In this 
model, social cohesion, task cohesion, and hardiness did not have significant influence on 
cohesion.110  
Building from this previous model, another regression analysis was conducted 
with additional demographic variables displayed in Table 14 (Appendix D). Factors for 
years in NSW, years at current Team, years in current Troop, and number of deployments 
were added to the cohesion model. This analysis shows that Troop leadership has both a 
                                                 
109 The regression analysis shows that the Platoon Commander contribution to cohesion has a 
coefficient of .502 and the Troop Chief has a coefficient of .331. The Platoon Chief has a negative 
coefficient while the Troop Commander in marginally positive. However, the results for both the Troop 
Commander and the Platoon Chief are not as statistically significant because their corresponding p-values 
are high. 
110 The coefficients for the Platoon Commander and Troop Chief for this model are .406 and .255 
respectively. The selection and training factor had a coefficient of .138 and p-value well below .05. 
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substantive and statistically large impact on cohesion.111 However, the results also show 
that social cohesion, task cohesion, and hardiness have less direct influence on cohesion 
than expected from the proposed theoretical framework. 
The three regression analyses conducted above show that demographic factors 
have little influence on the overall cohesion model. This, combined with the high 
correlation of task and social cohesion, lead to two additional regression analyses. After 
removing the demographic factors, cohesion was compared with the leadership variable 
and the variables associated with the original hypotheses. However, instead of comparing 
both task and social cohesion again, each factor, task and social cohesion, was compared 
individually with the remaining two hypotheses and leadership positions (Tables 15 and 
16 in Appendix D). This is due to the highly correlated nature of task and social cohesion 
addressed above in the correlation section. In these analyses, leadership continues to be 
the primary influencer and the selection and training factors continues to make minor 
impacts in both models.  What is significant with this new model is that, once separated, 
both task and social cohesion make positive contributions to cohesion at the same relative 
level of the selection and training factor. This final, refined regression provides the most 
consistent results with respect to the independent variables. The key to this consistency 
was separating the factors of task cohesion and social cohesion, due to their highly 
correlated nature, in the overall regression analysis. 
2. Leadership 
The regression analyses above show, out of all the factors examined in the NSW 
Unit Cohesion survey, leadership is the most significant contributor to unit cohesion 
within the Troop. To determine what factors influence the Troop leadership, further 
analysis examined how social cohesion, task cohesion, hardiness, and demographic 
factors are relevant to each leadership position (Tables 17–20 in Appendix D). Since the 
task and social cohesion factors are so highly correlated the analysis was conducted using 
                                                 
111 The respective coefficient values for the Platoon Commander and the Troop Chief are .435 
and .257. The selection and training factor remained relatively equivalent while the corresponding p-value 
rose above the statistically significant threshold of .05 to .061. The high p-values for the four demographic 
factors (years in NSW, years at current Team, years in current Troop, and number of deployments) lessen 
the statistical significance of the results. 
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only the task cohesion factor. Task cohesion was chosen over social cohesion due to the 
slightly greater significance the former had in the overall analysis. This does not 
significantly change the results of the analysis, though it should be noted that there are 
slight variations in how each variable affects leadership. The results are consistent across 
all levels and show that hardiness is overwhelmingly the most significant contributor to 
leadership.112  
3. Theoretical Model Revisited 
The analysis of the NSW Unit Cohesion survey results serves to refine the 
theoretical framework developed earlier in Chapter III. Figure 5 in Chapter III shows the 
factors of the theoretical framework proposed to affect cohesion in NSW Troops: 
hardiness, leadership, selection and training, task cohesion, and social cohesion. The 
above analysis shows that leadership, particularly the Platoon Commander and Troop 
Chief, has the greatest direct impact on cohesion in NSW Troops. Task cohesion, social 
cohesion, and the selection and training factor make minor positive contributions to 
overall cohesion model. Hardiness does not appear to influence cohesion directly when 
analyzed within the original theoretical framework. However, the analysis reveals that 
hardiness is in fact highly relevant to leadership, which in turn has the strongest impact 
on the overall level of unit cohesion.  
The data reveals a new framework that has hardiness as the primary influence on 
leadership. The overall cohesion model is primarily influenced by leadership and, to a 
lesser extent, by task cohesion, social cohesion, and selection and training. This new 
framework is depicted visually in Figure 14. Though this has adjusted the original 
theoretical model, this revised model still encompasses all the original hypotheses.  In 
fact, this new framework further highlights the importance of leadership, making it an 
indispensible factor when examining unit cohesion. It is important to note that it not just 
 
                                                 
112 The respective coefficients of hardiness for Troop Commander, Troop Chief, Platoon Commander 
and Platoon Chief are .726, .769, .562, and .622. The respective p-values for Troop Commander, Troop 
Chief, Platoon Commander and Platoon Chief are .001, .006, .000, and .001. The consistently low p-values 
for the hardiness factor across all levels of leadership highlight the significance of these results.  
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leadership in and of itself that is important; rather, it is the underlying significance of 
hardiness within the levels of leadership that play the most important role in NSW Troop 
cohesion. 
 
Figure 14.   Revised NSW Unit Cohesion Framework   
4. Subgroup Analysis 
Additional analyses of NSW Unit Cohesion results were conducted comparing 
results across subgroups within the overall sample. The results support and validate the 
overall model with leadership, selection and training, task cohesion, and social cohesion 
directly correlated to the overall cohesion model. The comparisons offer a more nuanced 
interpretations based on Team location and rank. Specifically, east coast Teams were 
compared with west coast Teams and officers were compared with enlisted. 
Across both coasts, NSW leadership has the most significant influence on 
cohesion. On the east coast, in addition to hardiness being the main contributor to 
leadership, hardiness moves into the overall model and directly correlates to cohesion. 
The analysis of west coast data show that, of all the factors examined, only leadership has 
an influence on cohesion. Both task and social cohesion have minimal influence on the 
overall west coast cohesion model. Hardiness contributes to east coast leadership much 
more than west coast leadership. In addition to hardiness, the east coast leadership is 
impacted by both task and social cohesion. The west coast leadership is highly influenced 
by the selection and training factor. 
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At first glance, the NSW officer regression analysis would appear inconclusive. 
The results reveal that NSW officers do not believe leadership‘s contribution to cohesion 
is significant. However, this is inconsistent with all of the previous analyses that 
demonstrate the importance of leadership to cohesion. The enlisted results however, 
reveal that, from their perspective, leadership is in fact the most influential factor 
contributing to cohesion. The apparent paradox here is that the descriptive statistics show 
that officers rank leadership nearly as highly as the enlisted personnel.113 This is 
understandable when observing these responses within the context of leadership and 
followership. Those that are being led are more likely to be affected by the actions of 
their leaders than the leaders are to be affected by their own actions. In effect, leadership 
matters more to those being led than those doing the leading. Not only are these 
responses indicative of this leadership-followership dynamic, they also suggest that 
leadership within the NSW Troop is functioning properly. The enlisted results confirm 
that leadership is the primary influencer of cohesion in the overall model. Both social and 
task cohesion are not as influential in the overall cohesion model; however, along with 
hardiness they contribute to the leadership model. 
D. QUALITATIVE SURVEY RESPONSES 
The NSW Unit Cohesion Survey consisted of both quantitative responses—those 
addressed in the previous section of this study—and qualitative responses, where 
respondents were asked to provide comments on the overall impacts on cohesion, the 
effect the training and deployment cycle has on cohesion, and any other issues they felt 
were pertinent to the subject. The respondents provided both positive and negative 
observations on a variety of issues regarding personal, organizational, and operational 
dimensions. In an effort to consolidate the comments into a usable format for 
examination, the responses were categorized based on the levels of analysis introduced in 
Chapter II: the individual level, the primary group level, and the secondary group level. 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, each level of analysis should not be 
viewed in discrete terms. There are factors that impact the individual level and the 
                                                 
113 Refer to Histograms in Appendix D, Figures 24–33. 
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primary group level in equal part; however, the following section will address each issue 
in relation to the level of analysis having the most direct influence on the topic.  
1. Individual Level 
The origins of the effects on unit cohesion are dynamic and external influences at 
the individual level are sometimes overlooked. The individual level factor that appeared 
most often throughout the survey responses was the amount of family or personal time 
available to the members and the subsequent impact it has on an individual‘s dedication 
to the group. 
Related to factors detracting from unit cohesion is the limited amount of family 
interaction or personal time Troop members have outside of their work duties. This 
comes as little surprise given the increasing demands on the military in general, and SOF 
in particular, in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. This encompasses not only to the 
amount of time spent deployed but also the time spent training in preparation for 
deployment, usually away from home. One comment addressed this by noting the 
concern of ―actually being home when we are at ‗at home.‘‖114 This can transfer to the 
primary group level, for obvious reasons, when the stress of family issues or personal 
fatigue impacts the ability of the members to focus on work-related tasks when called 
upon.  
The family and personal time issue was addressed briefly in Chapter IV in the 
discussion on retention. This should signal that reduced family and personal time is less a 
problem for cohesion than it is a significant issue for NSW retention. The Quick Poll 
cited in Chapter IV indicates the top three concerns both officer and enlisted SEALs had 
for deciding to stay in the military were 1) time spent away from home, 2) impact of navy 
on family, and 3) balance between work and personal time.115  Therefore, that this issue 
 
 
                                                 
114 Anonymous Survey Respondent, February 2011. 
115 Newell, Whittam, and Uriell, ―2010 SEAL/SWCC/EOD/Divers Retention Quick Poll,‖ Slides 18–
23. 
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should appear again in this survey is not altogether surprising; however, it becomes even 
more interesting when shown how it interacts with the factors at the primary, and even 
secondary, group level. 
2. Primary Group  
The family and personal time factor addressed within the individual level of 
analysis becomes even more important for cohesion when it is applied to the primary 
group. This level incorporates the combination of multiple individual factors, as well as 
the organizational dynamics inherent to hierarchies. The concepts of trust, shared 
adversity, personal interaction, leadership, and continuity resonate most prominently 
across this level. 
The concept of trust and the importance it has on the Troop‘s ability to cohere is 
mentioned often throughout the survey. The majority of these comments stem from the 
prompt for feedback on the training and deployment cycle and the impact it has on 
cohesion. Most respondents stress the importance of the training and deployment cycle in 
developing trust in one another. This begins with the amount of time spent together in the 
simulated combat environment of training and becomes even more important when 
placed in circumstances of actual combat. Troop members must have that trust, not just in 
their teammates‘ abilities as operators, but also in their responsibilities that extend 
beyond training and the combat zone. 
Closely related to trust is the idea of shared adversity. This is separated from trust 
in the analysis because it appears that trust, as well as many other factors, comes as a 
result of the adversity Troop members share throughout training and deployment. This 
concept relates to the bonds created under stressful circumstances. Within NSW, this can 
be imbued during the initial crucible of Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) 
training, which every SEAL must complete and therefore could qualify as an individual 
trait; however, within the survey responses, this was used primarily to describe the Troop 
training and deployment cycle. The common theme of these comments includes terms 
such as camaraderie, commitment, and hardship.  
 75 
Incorporating the previous two issues, the idea of personal interaction appeared 
frequently in the comments. This can be seen as encompassing both the trust and shared 
adversity concepts, as well as being related to the variables of task and social cohesion, 
addressed in the quantitative portion of the survey. This also provides some insight into 
the high correlation between the social cohesion and task cohesion variables mentioned 
earlier in this chapter. The following quote provides a succinct representation of these 
concepts. 
By the time a Platoon deploys, its operators know everything about one 
another, both on a personal and operational level.  This cohesion is further 
strengthened during deployment and the conduct of combat operations.116 
However, this personal interaction does not come without at a cost. The cost of 
personal interaction with teammates is paid in reduced time with one‘s family, or 
personal time. The balance must be struck between the amount of bonding necessary to 
form a cohesive unit and the amount of time away from work to pursue individual needs. 
Clearly, as the following quote from an anonymous respondent demonstrates, this 
balance is not always being struck. ―This [amount of time together in training] allows us 
to become like a family.  I think I spend more time with my Troop than with my wife and 
kids.‖117 
To the extent the above issues can be mitigated at the Troop level, it is incumbent 
upon the Troop leadership to recognize and address such issues before they become 
disruptive to the ability of the Troop to function. As with the quantitative responses, 
leadership appears as a significant factor in the comments provided by the respondents. 
This study has suggested that the leadership is crucial for a variety of reasons; the 
following comment implies that leadership is, in fact, the linchpin in determining the 
success or failure of a Troop. 
 
 
                                                 
116 Anonymous Survey Respondent, February 2011. 
117 Anonymous Survey Respondent, February 2011. 
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If you have good leadership, even if the training provided sucks, they will 
adjust training to make sure the men get what they need to be successful. 
I‘ve seen great training cycles and Platoons that sucked because the 
headshed sucked. Leadership is everything.118 
This suggests that leadership can be both a positive and a negative determinant in 
Troop cohesion. Quality leadership is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition to 
foster unit cohesion.  
The final theme pertaining to the primary group that appeared consistently in the 
comments deals with continuity. Specifically for NSW, this manifests itself in the form of 
the ―flush and fill‖ issue first raised in Chapter IV. Directly related to unit readiness, 
continuity appeared in both positive and negative terms in its relationship to unit 
cohesion. In the positive sense, the following observation by another anonymous 
respondent underscores the importance of, not just cohesion, but effectiveness as well. 
Inter-deployment training cycle (multiple rotation/deployments with the 
same team members) improves the cohesiveness of any unit. The more 
continuity that is kept can only build on a unit‘s overall effectiveness and 
capacity.119 
Conversely, the lack of continuity is perceived to have significant influence on the ability 
to form cohesion Troops. ―However, under the ‗flush and fill‘ detailing process this puts 
everyone back to square one, especially in terms of cohesiveness.‖120  
The issue of continuity can have further reaching effects than just readiness and 
cohesion, however. Building on the idea of reduced readiness at the beginning of each 
cycle, this implies that greater time is needed to prepare the Troop to reach an operational 
state. This ties back into the issue of finding a balance between family and personal time 
and work time. Understanding that continuity contributes to readiness and readiness 
precedes effectiveness, there are powerful reasons for seeking to maintain greater 
continuity within NSW Troops, not only for its relationship to cohesion, but also for the 
implications it has on effectiveness. 
                                                 
118 Anonymous Survey Respondent, February 2011. 
119 Anonymous Survey Respondent, February 2011. 
120 Anonymous Survey Respondent, February 2011. 
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The topics addressed above in the individual and primary group levels of analysis 
serve as indicators of positive and negative dynamics within the overall organization. The 
following section will address some of the larger issues pertaining to the greater NSW 
organization, or the secondary group. 
3. Secondary Group  
Though the secondary group includes every level of command above the Troop, 
most of the following ideas concern the strategic level of leadership, Naval Special 
Warfare Command (WARCOM). It should be noted that these results represent 
perceptions of the individuals within the primary group. This is important to mention 
because this study draws its data predominantly from the primary group and thus, the 
results may be skewed somewhat in favor of their perceptions. However, this does not 
diminish the relevance of the message that is being sent: perception is reality unless a 
plausible alternative is provided. Thus far, no plausible alternative had been suggested; 
therefore, the reality that prevails is presented below. 
A large number of responses keyed on similarly themed topics that is best 
described within the construct of vertical communications. Communications from the 
upper echelons of command include strategic vision, guidance, and overarching policy. 
The comments identify a disconnection between WARCOM policy and the primary 
group expectations. ―The policies and decisions being made at the WARCOM level are 
often totally opposite of what the guys are trying to scream [from] the ground level.‖121 
This suggests a fundamental disagreement between the operational elements of NSW and 
the NSW higher leadership. Furthermore, this disagreement seems to center on the 
manner in which forces are employed. A respondent noted: 
Attitudes within our Troop are positive. Unfortunately, attitudes are often 
dampened by the upper echelon of NSW‘s decision-making process that 
prevents us from doing the jobs we feel make a difference.122 
                                                 
121 Anonymous Survey Respondent, February 2011. 
122 Anonymous Survey Respondent, February 2011. 
 78 
The most consistent theme within these comments is the disparity between what is 
being asked of the members of the Troops in terms of operational employment and what 
those individuals understand a SEAL‘s role in warfare to be. This speaks to the 
previously addressed issue of meaningful employment.123 A respondent affirms this in 
the following quote. 
I cannot stress enough the importance of an individual/group feeling 
gainfully employed. You can have an amazing group of people who get 
along and are managed well that will somehow become derailed down the 
line if they do not feel as though they are accomplishing something.124 
Meaningful employment has become a buzzword of sorts within NSW and, while 
it is an important concept, the term itself suggests a certain lack of objectivity involved in 
the assessment. This suggests that there are both subjective and objective portions to the 
analysis of the manner in which NSW personnel are employed. The idea of meaningful 
employment should be considered within the subjective portion; and to consider this 
concept objectively, the term ―appropriate employment‖ will also be used, suggesting a 
more significant linkage between preparation and employment.  
This should not diminish the importance of meaningful employment. The level of 
commitment, sacrifice, and dedication exhibited by individuals within NSW Troops 
creates expectations that can be satisfied only by carrying out the work they prepared so 
rigorously for. The idea that a certain set of tasks or type of operation holds meaning for 
someone cannot be understated. Meaningful employment suggests a deeper-seated 
resonance concerning the tasks that SEALs conduct. This important point alludes to the 
internalized culture of the NSW community. Thus, employment cannot be made 
meaningful or appropriate simply by wishing it away or expecting that the operational 
leadership will manage the expectations of the Troops. When those expectations are 
unfulfilled, discontent, disappointment, and even anger often becomes the reaction. As 
noted by another respondent: 
                                                 
123 This idea was first introduced in Chapter IV as one of the current issues within NSW. 
124 Anonymous Survey Respondent, February 2011. 
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The inability of the upper echelon of NSW to [consistently] put NSW 
forces in theaters of operation in which SEALs are best suited … has been 
(in my experience) the single most [sic] contributing factor to any Troop‘s 
lack of cohesion.125 
One final note on meaningful and appropriate employment will bring this 
discussion of the levels of analysis full circle. The importance of family and personal 
time has been established as one of the primary motivations for individuals to leave 
NSW. It is reasonable to suggest that individuals who spend time away from their 
families for training and deployment could more easily reconcile that time away if those 
activities were perceived as being meaningful. Simply put, individuals are more likely to 
accept the cost of reduced family or personal time if that which is taking them away is 
meaningful and appropriate. 
Chapter IV introduced the concept of a perception-reality gap that seems to be 
closely related to these issues of communication and meaningful and appropriate 
employment. The following section describes this concept in greater detail. 
4. The Perception-Reality Gap Model  
The Perception-Reality Gap model, initially described in Chapter IV, serves as a 
summary of some of the key issues that NSW currently faces, specifically concerning the 
vertical communications and employment issues discussed above.  The crux of the 
problem ultimately centers on the concept of leadership, both at the strategic and tactical 
level.  From the strategic perspective, the communication of the vision and the force 
employment decisions play the most important role in establishing the direction of the 
force.  At the tactical level, the leadership bears the responsibility of implementing that 
vision and ensuring compliance with the outlined strategic guidance.  Should the 
communicated direction of the force come into conflict with more present and powerful 
influences affecting the primary groups—such as training, indoctrination, and historical 
culture—a rift begins to form between what is perceived and what is real. 
                                                 
125 Anonymous Survey Respondent, February 2011. 
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Figure 15.   Perception-Reality Gap Model 
This rift between perception and reality begins to manifest itself in the context of 
operational capabilities. Every input that a prospective SEAL receives, from recruitment 
through initial assignment, indicates a tendency toward employment as a direct action 
force.126 Yet, within NSW under the current mission requirements, the units prepared to 
operate in that capacity outnumber the opportunities for operational employment in such 
a capacity. The required operational capabilities are established when the strategic 
leadership translates requirements from theater operational commanders and assigns them 
to the NSW force. When those requirements do not match with the actual operational 
capabilities, the gap widens.  
                                                 
126 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 17, 2003), II-3, 4. 
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This divergence continues throughout the training cycle and up until deployment. 
At this point, a force that is prepared for kinetic, direct action raids faces a deployment 
conducting non-kinetic operations for which there is little, or no, institutional preparation. 
This last point highlights the concept of appropriate employment, that is, that the 
objective preparation should closely match the actual employment. Therefore, in those 
units that are employed in situations that deviate from the commonly held expectations, 
i.e. optimal operational employment, the task of narrowing the gap between perceived 
employment and realized employment falls exclusively on the unit leadership.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The quantitative and qualitative results from the NSW Cohesion survey conducted 
for this study discovered important insights about the dynamics of NSW Troops and the 
larger organization within which they exist. The key findings drawn from these sections 
of the research span the individual, primary group, and secondary group levels of 
analysis. These results have varying importance to unit cohesion directly. However, as 
has been demonstrated, all are in some way connected to, and play an important role in, 
either the fostering, or inhibition, of unit cohesion in NSW Troops. 
At the individual level, the most important factor discovered in the NSW Unit 
Cohesion survey is the diminishing amount of family and personal time. At the primary 
group level, Troop leadership is the pivotal factor with respect to Troop cohesiveness. 
More specifically, hardiness proved to be the most consistent variable across each level 
of leadership and each sub group that was analyzed. Additionally, the relationship 
between task cohesion and social cohesion, as demonstrated by the highly correlated 
nature of the two variables, is somewhat unique to NSW. This idea discovered in the 
quantitative results has provided some context in the examination of the qualitative 
responses pertaining to personal interaction. Bridging the line between the primary and 
secondary group levels of analysis is the issue of continuity. This affects the primary 
group explicitly; however, the embeddedness of this issue within the overall system of 
the NSW force is such that it cannot be ignored within the secondary level of analysis. At 
the secondary level, the idea of vertical communication presents difficulty in the 
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presentation of NSW‘s strategic message and has deep ties to the manner in which NSW 
is employed. Finally, the issue of meaningful and appropriate employment and its impact 
provides linkages all the way down to the individual level of analysis.  
Out of these issues within the secondary group level of analysis emerges the 
Perception-Reality Gap model that identifies and explains the disconnect that exists 
currently between the strategic leadership of NSW and the operational units. These issues 
present a significant risk to the effectiveness of NSW operational elements as the military 
navigates the murky waters of the future of warfare. 
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VII. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not 
change—and USSOCOM is no exception. Guided by a comprehensive, 
enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape 
ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team. 
General Peter Schoomaker127 
This project proposed a model of unit cohesion in Naval Special Warfare (NSW) 
units based on factors of leadership, hardiness, social cohesion, task cohesion, and levels 
of selection of training. The analysis of the survey data collected clearly demonstrates the 
profound influence that leadership has on cohesion at the primary group level.128 This 
analysis also provides a new theoretical framework for understanding how cohesion 
works in NSW operational Troops. This new framework demonstrates that hardiness does 
not exert a direct influence on cohesion; however, of all the factors analyzed, hardiness 
consistently played a significant role at all four levels of leadership within the NSW 
Troop While the contribution of hardiness to unit cohesion is not direct, its contribution 
to leadership is of equal, if not greater, importance to understanding unit cohesion in 
NSW Troops. 
Chapter VI described the results of the statistical analysis and the qualitative 
observations received through survey comments and personal interviews. This chapter 
will combine the factors of unit cohesion developed in the theoretical model and the 
qualitative issues addressed to develop a series of recommendations to improve cohesion 
and thereby performance in NSW operational units. These recommendations address 
most of the pertinent issues identified in the previous chapter. It should be noted that each 
of the recommendations will require further assessment with respect to feasibility and 
                                                 
127 Gen. Peter Schoomaker, ―Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead‖, February 1, 1998, 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=651. 
128 This statistically confirms the qualitative observations made by Shils and Janowitz in one of the 
earliest studies on the effects of cohesion in military units. Shils and Janowitz, ―Cohesion and 
Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,‖ 248. 
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implementation. The research in this study provides a basis for these assessments and 
should be used when weighing the costs and benefits of implementation. 
A. MEANINGFUL AND APPROPRIATE EMPLOYMENT 
1. Recommendation 
Conduct a strategic mission and capability evaluation within NSW, within the 
broader strategic vision of Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), to address 
disparities between NSW recruitment, selection, and training processes and current 
operational requirements. 
2. Discussion 
Chapter IV, Setting the Stage, introduced the idea of meaningful employment and 
how the individuals in NSW Troops perceive it. Chapter VI expanded on the concept and 
introduced an additional, objective element of appropriate employment. This suggests 
that there is a disconnection between the training and preparation NSW Troops undergo 
and the operations that they actually undertake while forward deployed. This 
disconnection is not always the case; however, the response from the force on the issue of 
meaningful employment is a significant enough to warrant serious consideration in 
developing potential remedies.  
From the time a prospective SEAL decides to join the U.S. Navy and labors on 
the lengthy and demanding path to becoming a SEAL, he is bombarded with pop-culture 
versions of what NSW does when operationally employed. Emphasis in this respect is 
placed on the demanding and dynamic training a candidate endures to earn the coveted 
Naval Special Warfare Insignia, the Trident. This entire training and indoctrination 
process takes in excess of 50 weeks to complete prior to a new SEAL checking in to his 
first command. During this time, little of the non-kinetic aspect of what comprises many 
actual SEAL operational deployments is mentioned. This emphasizes the ―false 
advertising‖ problem mentioned in Chapter IV and represents the incipient stage of the 
Perception-Reality Gap. 
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The problems underpinning the Perception-Reality Gap become ingrained at the 
primary group level during pre-deployment work-up when the preponderance of training 
focuses on kinetic action. The message being conveyed is straightforward: NSW is a 
force that conducts kinetic action missions with an emphasis on speed, surprise, and 
violence of action. For the most part, this mentality prevails throughout the training cycle 
until, often, the reality of deployment sets in. The result of this gap between expectations 
and reality appears to be increased disillusionment, particularly when the expectations 
involve ―clos[ing] with the enemy,‖ and reality often falls short of that.129 This is due, in 
large part, to the strong organizational culture that has been cultivated throughout NSW‘s 
history. This places the organizational culture and current training in direct conflict with 
NSW‘s operational requirements and employment.  
3. Conclusion: Strategic Mission and Capability Evaluation  
To address the Perception-Reality Gap that has been created, NSW should 
undertake a Strategic Mission and Capability Evaluation that considers a shift in how 
NSW forces are employed in operational theaters. This should involve a consideration 
toward balancing the current theater requirements and the training the Troops receive. 
Furthermore, this may involve a divestment in, and prioritization of, some activities and 
additional requirements that do not align with NSW‘s organizational culture and the 
training inherent to NSW.  
Critical to this evaluation is interaction with NSW‘s two primary external 
stakeholders: United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the 
Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC). The focus of this principally involves the 
expectations of both stakeholders and leads to a two-part question that must be asked of 
each: What does USSOCOM and the GCCs expect of NSW and do those expectations 
align with the organizational culture and current training? If the answer to the second part 
is no, then a rationale for the strategic evaluation exists.  
Another critical point to be mindful of in this evaluation speaks to the perceived 
disconnect between NSW leadership and operational level units. The strategic evaluation 
                                                 
129 Anonymous Survey Respondent, February 2011. 
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mentioned in this section must be an inclusive process that involves leadership at all 
levels and not an initiative that appears to come down from on high. This is the central 
theme of the second discussion and recommendation section that seeks to flatten the 
communications and provide a voice for the operational element in the decisions that are 
made regarding force-wide operational employment. 
B. VERTICAL COMMUNICATIONS  
1. Recommendation 
Implement a Junior Leaders Conference in order to give NSW community 
stakeholders an outlet to voice opinions, take part in community discussion, and open 
lines of communication with senior NSW commanders. 
2. Discussion 
As mentioned in the previous section, an apparent disconnection between the 
strategic leadership of NSW and the operational elements—ultimately the NSW 
Troops—has caused far-reaching issues that have appeared consistently throughout the 
research results. The common responses indicated a lack of understanding of what was 
occurring at the Platoon and Troop level. What perhaps more accurately represents this 
problem is that there are no institutionalized mechanisms or processes by which the 
strategic leadership can to convey emerging issues or provide broad guidance to the 
majority of the force on a sustained basis. Of almost equal importance, there are no 
processes in place with which the individual SEAL writ large, or a representative 
delegation, can provide feedback and input to emerging issues. By definition, this two-
way communication does not exist in NSW. 
Opening lines of communication is not an issue of who is right or wrong, since 
there will almost always be dissention on certain issues in any organization. To invoke a 
business paradigm, this discussion is focused on opening the lines of communication in 
order to provide the principal stakeholders an opportunity to weigh in on issues with their 
board of directors. While it is understood that this is the military, not a democracy or a 
corporation, the individuals at the stakeholder level represent, among other things, 
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valuable investments whose retention is in the best interests of the organization. These 
individuals always have the right to vote with their feet once their obligation is fulfilled 
and indications exist that suggest this has begun to happen.130 
3. Conclusion: Junior Leaders Conference  
In order to address this communication shortcoming, a Junior Leaders Conference 
should be established that meets twice a year to discuss pertinent issues within NSW. The 
conference membership would be comprised of Troop Commanders, Troop Chiefs, 
Platoon Commanders, and Platoon Chiefs. The forum for this should be off-site and 
include representative leadership from both east and west coast teams. The issues can 
range from those that are generated internally within the committee or those that are 
suggested by the upper echelon; however, the emphasis should be on providing the 
tactical level leadership an institutionalized role in organizational decision-making.  
C. LEADERSHIP CONTINUITY 
1. Recommendation 
Develop a personnel rotation model that maintains leadership continuity through 
offset leadership rotation in NSW operational units to increase mission flexibility and 
improve unit cohesion and performance. 
2. Discussion 
Chapter II demonstrated that improved performance and effectiveness is directly 
correlated with increased unit cohesion. This study has shown that leadership is essential 
to unit cohesion in NSW. However, under the current training-deployment cycle, the 
personnel demands throughout the community force a complete change of leadership at 
the Team, Troop, and Platoon level every two years. There is little to no leadership 
continuity in the current two-year rotation cycle. This problem, known as ―flush and fill,‖ 
was identified and described in Chapter IV. Changing out the leadership wholesale within 
the primary group squanders the opportunity to strengthen the cohesion already 
                                                 
130 Winters, ―Naval Special Warfare Pressure on the Force,‖ 2, 4. 
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established and forces the unit to start developing cohesion again from the most basic 
level. The levels of readiness, effectiveness, and cohesion of the Troop are directly tied to 
the continuity of leadership. The leadership turnover in the current model produces a 
saw-tooth pattern of readiness/effectiveness/cohesion over time at the Team level and 
below.131 Readiness is at the nadir directly following the leadership turnover, builds 
during the training cycle, and peaks while on deployment. Offsetting the leadership 
rotation would increase leadership continuity and help maintain a consistently higher 
level of cohesion, thereby improving and similarly maintaining the readiness and 
effectiveness of NSW as a whole.  
Additionally, maintaining a higher level of readiness in NSW will actually 
improve the flexibility of the community. Improved readiness will afford the ability to 
surge Platoon, Troops, and Teams as necessary to meet in extremis national 
requirements. This capability is extremely limited in the current training-deployment 
cycle. Coupled with improved flexibility, offsetting leadership will lead to increased 
family/personal time. The maintenance of higher levels of readiness will reduce the need 
for extended training trips. Training would be able to start at a higher level and progress 
much more rapidly. This would lessen the time required for each training block and allow 
more family/personal. Lastly, moving to a leadership continuity model has the potential 
to decrease overall operational costs. Shortened and less frequent training blocks will 
costs less than the lengthy and often repetitive training blocks of the current model. 
3. Conclusion: Ensure Leadership Continuity in NSW Troops  
Leadership assignments in NSW should be offset within the unit so that someone 
who has completed a previous training/deployment cycle occupies one of the key 
positions within both Platoon and Troop leadership levels. The ideal rotation for 
maintaining leadership continuity would be to stagger the rotation of commander and 
chief at both the Troop and Platoon level. This would provide a sustainable leadership 
continuity model that maintains the highest overall level of readiness. A similar 
continuity program is already in existence at the junior enlisted level within Platoons. At 
                                                 
131 See Figure 8 in Chapter IV. 
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the end of each deployment, while the leadership completely transitions, some of the 
junior-enlisted in a Platoon are transferred and the rest remain for the next cycle.  
Figure 16 provides a notional representation of the relationship between the 
leadership continuity and unit readiness. This model is based upon the rotation cycle of 
an east coast SEAL Team that will be discussed further on in this section. 
 
Figure 16.   Notional Readiness-Continuity Model 
There are several possible ways to implement a program to allow for leadership 
continuity. This recommendation section will offer two possible solutions. One way to 
improve leadership continuity would be to lengthen the projected rotation date (PRD) of 
officers and senior enlisted positions in the Platoon and Troop.  This would allow for an 
offset leadership rotation schedule without altering the current two-year training-
deployment cycle. This model would be difficult to implement without drastically 
changing career path management at both the officer and senior enlisted level. However, 
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only through more in-depth analysis, can it be determined if the benefits of improved, and 
maintained, readiness outweigh the cost of implementation. 
An East Coast SEAL Team offers another model for implementing a leadership 
continuity model. This model uses a shortened training-deployment cycle with the 
rotation of key leaders at both the Troop and Platoon level discussed above. This Team 
uses a one-year training/deployment (8 months training/4 months deployed) cycle. This 
implementation scheme has the added benefit of not changing PRD schedules or 
interfering with the current NSW career path. Additionally, the implementation of this 
model offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the effect leadership continuity has on both 
cohesion and readiness in a small-scale test case. If levels of cohesion and performance 
are maintained at an improved and higher level, as this research suggests, this example 
could be used as a model and implemented across NSW community. 
D. LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT 
1. Recommendation 
Implement a program to develop hardiness in NSW tactical leaders to give those 
leaders additional tools to establish and expand cohesion in operational units and thereby 
improve performance and effectiveness. 
2. Discussion 
The concept of psychological hardiness is long established and fundamental to 
NSW. A study conducted by the Naval Health Research Center in 1994 attempted to 
develop a personality profile for a Navy SEAL. SEALs on both coasts were administered 
a personality profile inventory and compared with adult male norms. The study 
concludes, ―SEALs appear to be calm, hardy, secure, and not prone to excessive 
psychological stress or anxiety [emphasis added].‖132 More recently, hardiness and the 
related concept resilience has been incorporated into the assessment and selection process 
for entering Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL School (BUD/S). The computerized 
                                                 
132 D. E. Braun et al., Personality Profiles of U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) Personnel (San Diego, 
CA: Naval Health Research Center, May 1994), 13, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA281692. 
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special operations resilience test (C-SORT) measures potential recruits along five 
personality traits including hardiness.133 C-SORT values combined with the Physical 
Screening Test (PST) score has been found to accurately predict BUD/S completion. In 
an attempt to reduce attrition in training, the combined C-SORT and PST scores are used 
to determine selection for BUD/S training. 
The research conducted in this study shows a causal pathway from hardiness to 
performance via leadership and cohesion. High hardy leaders have been shown to 
improve cohesion in the units they lead. This improved cohesion is translated into higher 
performing and more effective NSW units. 
3. Conclusion: Incorporate Hardiness Training  
While the results of this research have shown that SEALs have higher than 
average scores for hardiness, there is room for improvement. Currently, hardiness is 
measured as a selection tool for accession into BUD/S training; however, it is not taught 
or formally instructed within the NSW community. If this is an important enough factor 
to include in an assessment of a potential candidate, why is it not of any further interest 
once that individual has been selected? It makes sense then, that instruction to increase 
hardiness within NSW should be incorporated at an institutional level. The potential to 
improve performance and effectiveness with little cost in time or money is very high. 
Targeting the key leaders in the Troop for hardiness training will further minimize the 
cost. Programs like the Junior Officer Training Course (JOTC) and the SEAL Lieutenants 
Career Course (SLCC) are ideal venues for incorporating hardiness training targeted at 
NSW Troop leadership. Additionally, relatively low-cost seminars in the civilian sector 
offer the potential for beneficial training in this area. The established relationship 
between hardiness, leadership, and cohesion warrants the minimal investment necessary 
to establish an institutional program for fostering this this trait.  
 
                                                 
133 ―C-SORT Working Group Out-Brief‖ (Naval Special Warfare Presentation, Naval Personnel 
Research, Studies, and Technology, March 2010). 
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E. OBSERVATIONS 
1. Personal Interaction  
With respect to task and social cohesion, NSW is a very unique organization. 
Task and social cohesion are so closely correlated as to be virtually interchangeable. This 
shows that the line between ―work and play‖ is so fine that it is practically 
indistinguishable. When viewed externally, this phenomenon is somewhat 
understandable. The path to becoming a SEAL requires sacrifice, self-selection (twice— 
the U.S. Navy and NSW), and over a year of additional levels of selection and training. 
This is just the initial cost of entry. By the time a SEAL deploys for the first time, he has 
completed hundreds of training evolutions and passed countless performance evaluations. 
This process will undoubtedly produce an individual who is largely in sync and in line 
with the goals and norms of the organization and fellow members. In the process, work 
and socialization merge into one interrelating dynamic, each feeding and building off the 
other.  
2. Family and Personal Time  
There are numerous programs already in place to address the family concerns 
within the NSW community; however, none address the underlying problem directly. The 
survey respondents raised concerns of operational commitments on family and personal 
time. The programs that are in place serve only to aid families in coping with the strain of 
their spouse or parent‘s frequent absences, while none of the programs directly address 
the problem facing families: having their loved ones gone frequently.  
The solution to this lies within the broader set of initiatives mentioned earlier in 
this chapter. A comprehensive evaluation of what NSW‘s priorities are may realign some 
of the requirements and provide the operational elements with a greater sense of 
meaningful employment. This can have a ripple effect in that the service member is more 
likely to be satisfied with the time spent away from home and consequently more able to 
translate the perceived importance of the operational commitments to his family. 
Additionally, a higher level of readiness, realized through shorter duration training-
deployment cycles, can result in less time away from home in training. These shorter-
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duration deployments can also have positive impacts on the family in that it is likely 
easier for a family to accept two four-month deployments in the space of two years, than 
it is one eight month deployment within the same period. Implementing these 
recommendations, in addition to maintaining the family support programs already in 
place, will better ensure the health of the force for what is likely to be an enduring 
commitment to the current long war. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This study has examined several salient issues within the NSW community. The 
authors‘ intent, from the outset, has been to provide authoritative data that can be used to 
support recommendations that represent marked change to improve overall effectiveness 
in the NSW Force. The study of NSW Troop cohesion provides a two-fold benefit. First, 
the results serve as a guide for NSW leadership at all levels, providing them with 
indicators of what important factors can foster, inhibit, contribute to, or degrade unit 
cohesion in NSW Troops. Second, the study serves as a platform from which to examine 
some of the larger issues that are tangentially related to unit cohesion.  
The survey results revealed that unit cohesion within the Troops is far above the 
norms of the comparison studies. Yet, the qualitative portion of the research revealed 
some underlying grievances with linkages to unit cohesion that indicated some greater, 
force-wide concerns that NSW strategic leadership must address. The recommendations 
put forth provide an initial step toward creating a more effective, flexible Special 
Operations Force that is responsive, both to appropriate requirements and, to a dynamic 
and changing external environment. As Gen. Schoomaker‘s quote at the beginning of this 
chapter indicated, NSW leadership should strive to continually improve and manage the 
Force within this rapidly changing environment. The recommendations presented in this 
study offer opportunities to improve cohesion, performance, and effectiveness in NSW. 
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APPENDIX A:  NSW UNIT COHESION SURVEY 
 
Figure 17.   NSW Unit Cohesion Survey – Page 1 
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Figure 23.   NSW Unit Cohesion Survey – Page 7 
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APPENDIX B:  PCI-NSW UNIT COHESION SCALES 
OB-Instrumental, Needs (OB-I,N):  addresses the extent to which member's basic 
and social needs are being met.
OB-Instrumental, Goals (OB-I,G):  addresses the extent to which member 
enlistment goals are being met.
Vertical Bonding (VB)
Organizational Bonding (OB)
VB-Instrumental (VB-I): addresses the technical expertise and training skills of 
the leaders in the troop.
OB-Affective, Member Values (OB-A,MV):  addresses the importance of key Navy 
and NSW values to troop members.
OB-Affective, Leader Values (OB-A,LV):  addresses the importance of the same 
values to leaders in the troop.
OB-Affective, Pride (OB-A,P):  addresses how proud individuals are to be members 
of the troop.
OB-Instrumental, Anomie (OB-I,A):  addresses the extent to which there is a 
rational environment for action by the troop members.
HB-Affective (HB-A):  addresses the extent that members in a troop trust and care 
about one another.
HB-Affective, Leaders (HB-A,L):  address the extent that leaders in a troop trust and 
care about one another.
HB-Instrumental (HB-I):  addresses how well the members of the troop work 
together as a team.
VB-Affective (VB-A): addresses how much the members and leaders within the 
troop care about each other.
Horizontal Bonding (HB)
 
Table 6.    Explanation of PCI-NSW Unit Cohesion Scales  
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APPENDIX C:  INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Due to your position as a mid to senior level leader in the Naval Special 
Warfare community, you are invited to participate in an interview about 
some of the issues currently facing the community.  LT Bryan Jennings 
and LT Jamie McRandle are SEAL officers conducting this study while 
completing their studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey.  
The focus of this research is to examine factors that contribute to unit 
cohesion in Naval Special Warfare Troops.   
Your input will supplement a survey that has been distributed to each 
operational Troop across the community.  Your unique perspectives and 
observations will hopefully aid us in understanding how to achieve greater 
unit cohesion in the Troops and ultimately, help make the Teams a more 
effective organization.  We have the authorization of both the Naval 
Postgraduate School and Naval Special Warfare Command to conduct this 
research.  The interview responses will be kept completely anonymous, 
unless otherwise specified by you, and participation is voluntary.  Your 
input is important to us and we hope you will choose to participate.  
However, you are free to stop participating, or chose to not answer certain 
questions, at any point during the interview. 
B.  QUESTIONS 
1. Establishing a Baseline 
1- Can you describe what you understand unit cohesion to be? 
2- Based on your experience and observations, describe the relationship 
between unit cohesion in NSW elements and that unit‘s performance.  If 
you can, provide positive and negative examples. 
2. Establishing the Problem 
3- In your view, what are the top three issues currently affecting Naval 
Special Warfare at the tactical/operational (Troop) level (could be either 
positive or negative)?  Please describe your rationale behind each choice. 
3. Potential Remedies/Status of Current Remedies 
4- In reference to the above mentioned issues, what, in your view, are 
some feasible remedies that might improve cohesion among NSW 
Troops? 
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5- Of the issues for which there are currently remedies already in effect, 
how effective are they at achieving their intended goals?  Are there other 
avenues that have not yet been explored? 
6- Rank, in order of overall significance, the following issues and explain:  
 a) how you feel they impact the cohesiveness of the NSW Troop;
 b) how they influence the overall effectiveness of the force. 
Meaningful employment (job satisfaction, sense of 
purposeful mission)  
   Turnover following IDTC (flush and fill). 
 
 
   Squadron and Troop Leadership Experience and Capability 
 
 
   Retention 
 
 
Training and Deployment cycle (impact of the length of each block 
on the individuals). 
 
 
Perception-Reality gap (Expectation management, Training-
employment fit; e.g., training exclusively for DA/Assault and yet 
(in some cases) deploying to conduct only FID/SFA). 
 
4. Conclusion 
7- Are there any other issues related to unit cohesion that you feel would 











APPENDIX D:  STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
A. DEMOGRAPHICS 
Rank Frequency Percentage 
E-3 1 .6 
E-4 17 9.8 
E-5 49 28.3 
E-6 34 19.7 
E-7 13 7.5 
E-8 11 6.4 
O-1 7 4.1 
O-2 8 4.6 
O-3 22 12.7 
O-4 11 6.4 
Total 173 100.0 






East Coast 96 53.0 
West Coast 77 42.5 
NMF 8 4.5 
Total 181 100.0 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 
Table 8.    Respondents by Command 
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B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Norms NSW 
Question Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
1 2.29 0.88 3.335 0.886 
2 2.48 0.95 3.313 0.968 
3 2.37 0.92 3.335 0.917 
4 2.45 0.89 3.398 0.901 
5 2.76 0.9 3.337 0.980 
6 2.66 0.91 3.335 0.936 
7 2.48 0.96 3.500 0.868 
8 2.41 0.96 3.443 0.893 
9 2.55 1.04 3.438 0.879 
10 2.25 0.97 3.426 0.832 
11 2.55 0.91 3.379 0.896 
12 2.47 1.09 3.454 0.941 
13 2.76 0.87 3.511 0.821 
14 2.95 0.89 3.477 0.888 
15 2.46 1.01 3.434 0.834 
16 2.41 1.13 3.494 0.828 
17 1.75 1.3 2.269 1.357 
18 1.69 1.17 2.801 1.042 
19 2.32 0.98 3.352 0.914 
20 1.98 1.26 3.335 0.859 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 
Table 9.    PCI Norms Vs. NSW Descriptive Statistics 
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 West Coast 
Overall 
West Coast     
Troop 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Hardiness 2.232 .335 2.225 .370 
Troop Commander  1.612 .724 1.808 .345 
Troop Chief  1.475 .949 1.7 .564 
Platoon Commander 1.769 .374 1.742 .403 
Platoon Chief  1.745 .463 1.758 .427 
Selection & Training .259 1.063 .593 .92 
Task Cohesion 1.436 .871 1.457 .911 
Social Cohesion 1.268 .978 1.369 .955 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 
Table 10.   West Coast Sample Validity 
 East Coast 
Overall 
East Coast     
Troop 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Hardiness 2.292 .339 2.255 .376 
Troop Commander  1.506 .725 1.493 .658 
Troop Chief  1.288 1.054 1.622 .621 
Platoon Commander 1.618 .649 1.538 .706 
Platoon Chief  1.559 .672 1.613 .636 
Selection & Training .246 .882 .688 .998 
Task Cohesion 1.487 .736 1.146 .676 
Social Cohesion 1.404 .807 1.411 .774 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 
Table 11.   East Coast Sample Validity 
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C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Cohesion Coef R > t  
Troop Commander 
Troop Chief 






Number of Observations: 145 R-Squared: .44 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 
Table 12.   Cohesion – Leadership Regression Analysis 
 
Cohesion Coef R > t  
Troop Commander 
Troop Chief 






Hardiness .125 .431 
Task Cohesion .186 .290 
Social Cohesion -.041 .813 
Selection & Training .137 .054 
Number of Observations: 108 R-Squared: .59 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 




Cohesion Coef R > t  
Troop Commander 
Troop Chief 






Hardiness .050 .816 
Task Cohesion .136 .588 
Social Cohesion .035 .886 
Selection & Training .074 .394 
Age .027 .249 
Years in NSW -.018 .581 
No. of Deployments .018 .846 
Combat Deployments -.095 .291 
Number of Observations: 71 R-Squared: .59 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 









Overall Cohesion Coef R > t  
Troop Commander 
Troop Chief 






Hardiness .127 .421 
Task Cohesion .148 .025 
Selection & Training .136 .012 
Number of Observations: 108 R-Squared: .60 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 
Table 15.   Overall Cohesion (Task Cohesion) Regression Analysis 
 
 
Overall Cohesion Coef R > t  
Troop Commander 
Troop Chief 






Hardiness .140 .376 
Social Cohesion .129 .046 
Selection & Training .132 .016 
Number of Observations: 108 R-Squared: .59 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 




Troop Commander Coef R > t  
Hardiness 
Task Cohesion 
Selection & Training 





Years in Squadron -.006 .938 
Years in Troop -.168 .048 
No. of Deployments .045 .430 
Number of Observations: 106 R-Squared: .34 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 
Table 17.   Troop Commander Regression Analysis 
 
Troop Chief Coef R > t  
Hardiness 
Task Cohesion 
Selection & Training 





Years in Squadron .044 .606 
Years in Troop -.178 .107 
No. of Deployments .046 .551 
Number of Observations: 112 R-Squared: .27 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 




Platoon Commander Coef R > t  
Hardiness 
Task Cohesion 
Selection & Training 





Years in Squadron .004 .930 
Years in Troop -.048 .452 
No. of Deployments .016 .891 
Number of Observations: 106 R-Squared: .33 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 
Table 19.   Platoon Commander Regression Analysis 
 
Platoon Chief Coef R > t  
Hardiness 
Task Cohesion 
Selection & Training 





Years in Squadron -.027 .619 
Years in Troop -.039 .581 
No. of Deployments -.014 .771 
Number of Observations: 109 R-Squared: .28 
McRandle/Jennings 2011 





Figure 24.   Cohesion Histogram (Enlisted)   
 
Figure 25.   Troop Commander Leadership Histogram (Enlisted)   
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Figure 26.   Troop Chief Leadership Histogram (Enlisted)   
 
Figure 27.   Platoon Commander Leadership Histogram (Enlisted)   
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Figure 28.   Platoon Chief Leadership Histogram (Enlisted)   
 
Figure 29.   Cohesion (Officer)   
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Figure 30.   Troop Commander Leadership Histogram (Officer)   
 
Figure 31.   Troop Chief Leadership Histogram (Officer)   
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Figure 32.   Platoon Commander Leadership Histogram (Officer)   
 
Figure 33.   Platoon Chief Leadership Histogram (Officer)   
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